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Corporations have the choice of expensing (using the fair value method), or non-
expensing (using the intrinsic value method and provide pro forma disclosure in financial 
statement footnotes) of employee stock options. The current study examines how corporate 
governance factors affect such choices. Prior studies (Xie et al. 2003; Klein 2002; Peasnell 
et al. 2000) have indicated that certain corporate governance factors have an impact on 
corporate accounting behavior, including earnings management. Based on the assumption 
that expensing employee stock options is a good practice of accounting that improves 
vii 
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earnings quality, it is hypothesized that these corporate governance factors would affect 
companies’ option expensing decisions, in ways similar to how they affect companies’ 
other earnings management choices.  
A series of hypotheses relating to specific corporate governance factors are 
developed. These corporate governance factors include: Board independence (percentage 
of independent directors on the board, CEO/board chairman split, and tenure of 
independent directors), board expertise (governance expertise and financial expertise), 
board diligence, board ownership, board size, CEO tenure, and internal blockholders 
(cumulative ownership percentage of internal blockholders, and whether the largest 
blockholder is the CEO).  
A sample of firms that elected to expense employee stock options up to early 
September 2003 is identified from the report of Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc. (2003), and a 
control sample of non-expensing firms is selected based on certain matching principles. 
The final sample consists of 235 expensing firms and 235 matched control firms, 470 firms 
in total. 
A logit regression is conducted. The dependent variable is companies’ decisions on 
whether or not to expense employee stock options. The independent variables are corporate 
governance factors and control variables. Regression results indicate that the following 
corporate governance factors have statistically significant impact on option expensing 
decisions in the directions predicted: finance expertise, board diligence, and whether the 
CEO is the largest blockholder. Regression results indicate a statistically significant impact 
on option expensing decisions, which is in the opposite direction than predicted, for the 
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cumulative ownership percentage of internal blockholders. The impacts of all other 
corporate governance factors are statistically insignificant. 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter One 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Employee Stock Option and Its Usage in Practice 
An employee stock option is a call option on a company’s own stock granted to 
employees. It gives the employee-optionholder the right to purchase the company’s stock 
at a specific price (strike price). When the market price exceeds the strike price, the 
employee can exercise the option to purchase the stock at the strike price and then sell it at 
the market price, thus realizing a profit from the transaction.  
Employee stock options have been widely used in compensation packages, 
including compensation for directors, different levels of executives, and non-executive 
employees. Employee stock options have received widespread acceptance from both 
practitioners and academics. They were considered an important contributor to economic 
development (Ferri et al. 2003). Ittner et al. (2003) found in “new economy firms,”1 firm 
performance tended to be poorer in subsequent years if the value of option grants or extant 
holdings of stock options were lower than the predicted level. Employee stock options 
were regarded as an effective tool to align management incentives with shareholders’ 
interest, since the value of the employee stock options increases with the increase in firm 
                                                 
1 “New economy firms” as defined in Ittner et al. (2003) are “organizations competing in the 
computer, software, internet, telecommunications, or networking fields” (90). 
1 
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value (Hanlon et al. 2003; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Haugen and Senbet 1981; Hemmer 
et al. 1999). Ryan and Wiggins (2002) found that option compensation reduced 
management’s risk-avoiding tendency and encouraged risk-taking investment behavior, 
and thus aligned management’s interest with that of shareholders.  
However, after the stock price collapse of the technology companies, that are heavy 
users of employee stock options, and the series of corporate debacles in 2002 such as 
Enron, WorldCom, etc. (Aboody et al. 2003), the consequences of employee stock option 
usage has been questioned by both practitioners and academic researchers. Investors are 
concerned that options facilitate wealth transfer from shareholders to employee-
optionholders (Gao and Shrieves 2002; Liang and Sharpe 1999). Gao and Shrieves (2002) 
found that the amount “and the incentive intensity of stock options, are positively related to 
earnings management intensity” (2). In a summary of previous studies, Hanlon et al. 
(2003) stated that there exist “the incentive alignment and rent extraction perspectives” of 
stock option grants. With regard to the “rent extraction perspective,” they stated that 
“others claim that stock options do not exhibit empirical relations consistent with the 
economic motivations behind granting them … and may even be a politically expedient 
way of cloaking senior managers’ pay as such compensation is generally not recorded in 
the firms’ financial statements ... . Researchers have also presented evidence that managers 
abuse option grants for their own benefit” (Hanlon et al. 2003, 4). 
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Accounting for Employee Stock Options: 
The Debate over Expensing vs. Non-Expensing 
 
Evolution of Standards: From Non-Expensing to Expensing 
The evolution of accounting for employee stock options has gone through a long 
process in the U.S., witnessing the political nature of accounting standard setting and 
standard application by corporations. One of the major themes of the debates surrounding 
accounting for employee stock options is whether the cost of employee stock options 
should be accounted for using the fair value method or the intrinsic value method. In 1972, 
the Accounting Principles Board (APB) issued APB No. 25 Accounting for Stock Issued to 
Employees, which prescribed the intrinsic value method of accounting for employee stock 
options. Under this method, the compensation expense to be recognized over the vesting 
period of the options is the excess of the market price over the strike price at the 
measurement date, the date on which the strike price and the number of options are known 
(Aboody et al. 2003). Fixed option grants are those grants for which the exercise price and 
the number of options are known on the grant date; thus, the measurement date for fixed 
option grants is the grant date. If the strike price is equal to or above the market price for 
fixed option grants, no compensation expense needs to be recognized. Therefore, most 
companies chose to issue employee stock options at a strike price at the market price of the 
stock, thus avoiding recognizing related compensation expense in financial statements 
(Aboody et al. 2003; Ferri et al. 2003). While employee stock options have increasingly 
been used as a form of compensation, no compensation expense is reflected in companies’ 
financial statements. With the appearance of better option pricing models, the FASB 
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reconsidered the proper method of accounting for employee stock options, and issued in 
1993 an Exposure Draft entitled Accounting for Stock-Based Compensation, requiring 
companies to recognize employee stock options as a compensation expense using the fair 
value method. Other issues that led to this new development in standard setting include the 
widespread usage of fixed stock options along with the inconsistency of accounting 
treatment for fixed stock options, variable stock options and stock appreciation rights 
(Dechow, Hutton and Sloan 1996). The inconsistency is that fixed stock options receive 
the special treatment of no expense recognition if the stock price does not exceed the strike 
price at the grant date (Dechow, Hutton and Sloan 1996). Under the fair value method, for 
fixed option grants, even if the strike price is not below the market price on the grant date, 
companies still have to recognize a compensation expense in financial statements. This 
amount is determined by an option pricing model, such as the Black-Scholes model or the 
binomial model. 
The 1993 exposure draft received widespread opposition, even threatening the 
status of the FASB. In 1995, the FASB issued SFAS No. 123 Accounting for Stock-Based 
Compensation, which is a compromise to political pressure. Unlike the 1993 exposure 
draft, SFAS No. 123 does not mandate the fair value method. Instead, companies can 
either use the fair value method, or continue to use the intrinsic value method prescribed by 
APB No. 25, provided that they disclose pro forma information in footnotes, as if the fair 
value method had been used. In December 2002, the FASB issued SFAS No. 148 
Accounting for Stock-Based Compensation--Transition and Disclosure--an amendment of 
FASB Statement No.123, which prescribed alternative transition methods for companies 
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that elect to adopt the fair value method and amended disclosure requirements, including 
requiring disclosure in interim financial reports. In 2004, the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB) issued International Financial Reporting Standard 2 Share-based 
Payment (IFRS 2), which required the recognition of employee stock option related 
compensation expense. 
Both the fair value method and the intrinsic value method require the recognition of 
employee stock option related compensation expense. The distinction is on how to value 
employee stock options. Most companies chose to issue to employees fixed option grants 
(option grants for which the exercise price and the number of options are known on the 
grant date) with a strike price which is at the market price on the grant date (Aboody et al. 
2003; Ferri et al. 2003). Under this situation, the choice between the fair value method and 
the intrinsic value method results in recognition or non-recognition of employee stock 
option related compensation expense, respectively. To be consistent with the terminology 
used in the popular press, in the current study, companies are referred to as expensing 
employee stock options if they choose the fair value method, and non-expensing if they 
choose the intrinsic value method. 
 
Corporate Reactions: From Opposition to Expensing 
Many companies have been opposed to the expensing of employee stock options 
(Bodie et al. 2003; Borrus et al. 2002; Guay et al. 2003). The American Stock Exchange 
reported in a survey of over 200 chief executive officers of companies listed on the 
exchange that 84 percent were against using the fair value method (Berton 1994). 
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Corporations lobbied against expensing of employee stock options (Guay et al. 2003). 
Most of the comment letters on FASB’s 1993 Exposure Draft were opposed to the fair 
value method (Dechow, Hutton and Sloan 1996). “Opponents included the six major 
accounting firms, venture capitalists, start-up companies, [and] numerous industry 
associations” (Dechow, Hutton and Sloan 1996, 4). Among the current opponents of option 
expensing is the International Employee Stock Options Coalition, an organization that 
advocates for the importance of employee stock options, and represents a wide range of 
organizations, including high-tech firms. 
However, other companies saw an advantage to fair value expensing. In response to 
the series of accounting scandals including Enron, WorldCom, etc., they have announced 
their intentions to recognize stock-based compensation expense in financial statements 
using the fair value method, in order to signal higher quality earnings (Seethamraju and 
Zach 2003), and “to increase accounting transparency and … strengthen corporate 
governance practices” (Plitch 2003). Aboody et al. (2003) found that early (July 2002) 
announcers of expensing of employee stock options had abnormal returns on their stocks. 
 
Arguments Against Expensing of Employee Stock Options 
Ferri et al. (2003) provided a summary of the “arguments against and in favor of 
expensing stock options … presented in 2002 proxy statements of firms targeted by option 
expensing proposals [and] in debate about FASB’s 1993 proposal to recognize stock-based 
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compensation.”2 Their summary is comprehensive and representative of the current debate 
over expensing vs. non-expensing of employee stock options. 
According to the summary of Ferri et al. (2003), the arguments against expensing 
include the following: Since stock options reduce EPS, to expense stock options would 
“double count” the effect of employee stock options (ESOs); ESOs are not an expense; 
expensing ESOs reduces earnings and company value, which will lead investors to allocate 
resources to other companies; the option pricing models for publicly traded options are not 
suitable for employee stock options (the unique characteristics of which differ from traded 
options), and will lead to inaccurate information in financial statements; since most 
companies are not expensing stock options, if the company expenses ESOs, it will reduce 
the comparability of the company’s financial statements and put the company at a 
“competitive disadvantage”; the cost of employee stock options is already reflected in 
financial statement footnotes, recognizing the compensation expense would provide no 
additional information; employee stock options as compensation helps companies to attract 
and retain talented employees, expensing ESOs would limit its usage and harm those 
companies. 
High-tech companies are among the most active opponents. The following are the 
reasons for their opposition, as mentioned by researchers (Aboody et al. 2003; Borrus et al. 
2002; Ferri et al. 2003; Grey et al. 2002; Ittner et al. 2003): High-tech firms are 
                                                 
2 See Ferri, F., G. Markarian, and T. Sandino (2003), Stock options expensing: Evidence from 
shareholders’ votes. Working paper, New York University, New York, NY. (Available at: www.ssrn.com.) 
Pages 33-34: TABLE 2 Arguments Against and In Favor Of Expensing Stock Options. Panel A: Arguments 
presented in 2002 proxy statements of firms targeted by option expensing proposals; Panel B: Main 
arguments in debate about FASB’s 1993 proposal to recognize stock-based compensation. 
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intelligence-intensive, thus they need to attract and retain talented employees. However, 
many high-tech firms are at the start-up stage, thus are in lack of cash. Employee stock 
option, as a non-cash compensation tool, has helped solve the cash shortage problem and 
retain talented employees, thus significantly contributing to the prosperity of high-tech 
firms. Consequently, employee stock options have been extensively used by high-tech 
firms. Requiring fair value expensing of employee stock options would deprive these firms 
an important compensation tool and impair their economic growth. In addition, since many 
high-tech firms have low earnings even in absence of option expensing, typical of firms at 
the start-up stage, fair value expensing of employee stock options would have a greater 
impact on these firms’ earnings, compared to firms with better earnings. Many high-tech 
firms have more volatile stock prices. These firms have to recognize more compensation 
expense if fair value expensing is required, since according to option pricing models, the 
more volatile a firm’s stock price, the greater the estimated option value (Ross et al. 2004). 
Because of these unique situations, high-tech firms would be put to a disadvantage if fair 
value expensing is required. 
 
Merits of Expensing Employee Stock Options 
As summarized by Ferri et al. (2003), and similarly mentioned by Bodie et al. 
(2003) and Borrus et al. (2002), supporters of stock option expensing argue that: expensing 
employee stock options increases financial reporting transparency; employee stock options 
have value and are a compensation expense; inaccurate estimation from option pricing 
models is better and more accurate than no estimation, since no estimation essentially 
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states that employee stock options have no value; recognizing the compensation expense in 
financial statements has incremental value to footnote disclosure and disclosure is no 
substitute for recognition; investors already have access to information of employee stock 
options through footnote disclosures, recognizing the expense would not have a great 
impact on companies’ stock prices, and would not change investors’ resource allocation 
decisions; and expensing employee stock option helps to constrain its excessive usage in 
practice and helps to strengthen corporate governance. 
It is widely believed that not expensing options has led to excessive usage of stock 
options for compensation, and this practice in turn fuels earnings management (Bodie et al. 
2003; Gao and Shrieves 2002; Baker et al. 2003). According to Grey et al. (2002), the fact 
that employee stock options are not required to be recognized as an expense has an 
influence on companies’ policies. They stated that “firms that grant ESOs and thus avoid a 
charge against income, artificially boost earnings. Managers may favour share repurchases 
over conventional dividend payments as they buoy up share price with positive 
implications for the fair value of managers’ ESOs. [Requiring] firms to expense ESO costs 
could have [an impact on] dividend, compensation and financing policies” (12). 
Expensing of employee stock options has received increasing support from 
standard-setters and academics. Standard-setters (IASB 2004; FASB 1995) hold the view 
that employee stock options are a compensation expense; recognition of such expense 
improves earnings quality, reduces cost of capital, and thus facilitates better allocation of 
resources. As mentioned by Ferri et al. (2003), researchers (Aboody 1996; Aboody et al. 
2004; Li 2002) have found that stock prices reacted to employee stock option costs 
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disclosed in footnotes as if such costs exhibit the nature of an expense. Researchers argue 
for expensing of ESOs since expensing would provide useful information to investors 
(Guay et al. 2003; Bodie et al. 2003). Extant research has concluded that recognition 
provides incremental information beyond disclosure (Barth et al. 2003; Bodie et al. 2003; 
Espahbodi et al. 2002). This incremental information helps to reduce “information 
asymmetry between the firm and investors” (Aboody et al. 2003). Based on the 
incremental information argument, Aboody et al. (2003) stated that expensing employee 
stock options would result in higher quality earnings. Abnormal returns on stocks of 
companies that elected earlier (in July 2002) than other companies to expense employee 
stock options indicate investors’ positive reaction to such decisions (Aboody et al. 2003). 
This is consistent with Seethamraju and Zach’s (2003) argument of the signaling benefit of 
expensing of ESOs. 
 
The Basic Assumption: The Nature of Employee Stock Options 
How employee stock options should be accounted for is directly related to the 
question of “what is the nature of employee stock options”? Currently, there are different 
perspectives in academic and empirical discussions regarding the nature of employee stock 
options: the asset view and the expense view. 
Under the asset view, employee stock option grants are valuable assets of the 
company, because these grants help to align employees’ interest with that of the 
stockholders’, and also help to retain important employees. Bell et al. (2002) estimated 
valuation equations incorporating different methods of accounting for employee stock 
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options, and found that the market appeared to value employee stock options as an asset 
and not as an expense. Rees and Stott (1998) found “a significant association between the 
disclosed compensation expense using the fair value method and firm value that is in the 
opposite direction from other income statement expenses.” Keating et al. (2003) in their 
study attempted to identify factors (including employee stock options related issues) that 
led to the economic downturn of internet firms in spring 2000, and found that “stock 
option grants by certain firms are positively associated with value” (191). This finding is 
consistent with the argument that employee stock options exhibit the nature of an asset. 
The asset view implies that employee stock options should be accounted for as an asset. 
Under the expense view, employee stock options are a compensation expense. This 
view has been adopted by many researchers (Aboody et al. 2003; Bodie et al. 2003; Guay 
et al. 2003) and regulators, including the FASB (FASB 1993, 1995) and the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB 2004). Aboody (1996) found a negative correlation 
between his estimated outstanding option values and share prices for the sample firms. 
This suggests the expense nature of employee stock options. Similar findings have been 
provided by Aboody et al. (2004) and Li (2002). Under the expense view, employee stock 
options should be accounted for as compensation expense, and thus reduce net income. 
This study is based on a similar assumption as that in previous studies (Aboody et 
al. 2003; Ferri et al. 2003; Seethamraju and Zach 2003), that is, expensing of employee 
stock options is a sound accounting practice, improves earnings quality, and is in 
compliance with stockholders’ interest. In other words, employee stock options are a 
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compensation expense. The expense view has received widespread support, which is the 
reason that the current study is based on this assumption. 
 
Objective of the Study 
The view that expensing employee stock options is a good accounting practice that 
improves earnings quality has received increasing support (Bodie et al. 2003; Borrus et al. 
2002; FASB 1993, 1995; IASB 2004). More and more companies have elected to 
recognize options related compensation expense. What factors affect companies’ decisions 
to expense employee stock options? Aboody et al. (2003) investigated a series of factors 
and found that “the likelihood of recognizing stock-based compensation expense is 
significantly related to the effect of the expense on reported earnings and accounting-based 
contracts, the firm’s investor base and governance structure, the extent to which the firm is 
active in the capital market, and whether the firm is a leader in its industry” (1). 
Ferri et al. (2003) examined factors influencing shareholders to vote for and against 
proposals of expensing employee stock options. They found that “the magnitude of 
excessive option compensation of the CEO,” institutional holdings and size had a positive 
impact on shareholders’ votes for expensing, whereas “the expected earnings impact of 
expensing options,” insider holdings, and past performance had a negative impact on 
shareholders’ votes for expensing employee stock options. 
Seethamraju and Zach (2003) found that companies with greater publicity exposure 
and companies for which the market interpreted option expensing as good news were more 
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likely to expense employee stock options. They did not find any impact of corporate 
governance on expensing decisions. 
Corporate governance and accounting for employee stock options are receiving 
increased attention in practice and in research. The impact of corporate governance factors 
(specifically board characteristics) on corporate accounting behavior in general has been 
well documented in the literature. However, studies on the relation between corporate 
governance and financial reporting issues specifically related to employee stock options 
have not been many. A few studies (Baker 1999; Aboody et al. 2003; Ferri et al. 2003; 
Seethamraju and Zach 2003) have addressed questions in this area. In his study of the 
influence of unexplained compensation and institutional ownership on firms’ 
underreporting of estimated executive stock option values in proxy statements, Baker 
(1999) included certain corporate governance related variables in his analysis. He found 
that companies with larger boards and companies with the CEO as the chairman of the 
board tended to report lower estimated executive stock options values in their proxy 
statements. He did not find significant impact of CEO’s ownership and stockholdings “by 
the non-CEO director with the largest block of ownership” on the degree of discount in 
option value estimates. He found an insignificant and negative impact of the proportion of 
inside directors on the board on the degree of discount, which is contrary to previous 
general understanding of the impact of inside directors. 
Guay et al. (2003) predicted that corporate “governance of expensing firms is more 
effective than that of the non-expensers,” based on the hypothesis that one of the reasons 
for corporate opposition to expensing of ESOs is that expensing “would influence 
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contracting arrangements by making ESO compensation to top executives more visible.” 
Several recent studies have addressed the impact of corporate governance factors on option 
expensing decisions. The group of corporate governance related factors that Aboody et al. 
(2003) tested included “the proportion of equity held by outside directors,” which was 
found to have a significant and positive impact on the likelihood of a company’s expensing 
of options; “the extent to which outside directors are compensated in cash” and “whether 
the CEO is also a director,” for which no significant impact on option expensing was 
found. Ferri et al. (2003) found that “insiders’ ownership is positively associated to votes 
against expensing.” They did not find a significant association between cumulative 
ownership of external blockholders (as a control variable) and shareholders’ votes. 
Seethamraju and Zach (2003) studied the corporate governance factors of the percentage of 
outsiders on the board, ownership by outside directors, and ownership by inside directors. 
They found no evidence that corporate governance factors were associated with the 
likelihood of expensing options. 
The current study attempts to further the understanding of the impact of corporate 
governance related factors on option expensing decisions. This study seeks to answer the 
question: Do certain characteristics of the board of directors and certain other corporate 
governance factors affect companies’ decisions on whether to expense employee stock 
options? This study differs from previous studies (Aboody et al. 2003; Ferri et al. 2003; 
Seethamraju and Zach 2003) that have addressed the relation between corporate 
governance and expensing of employee stock options in that previous studies only 
examined the impact of limited corporate governance factors along with a series of other 
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non-governance factors on option expensing decisions, while the current study narrows the 
scope to corporate governance factors only and expands the set of corporate governance 
factors. This allows a more comprehensive study on the impact of corporate governance 
related factors on companies’ expensing decisions. Corporate governance related factors 
not included in previous studies are tested in the current study, and those factors with 
inconclusive extant results in previous studies are tested again. Prior studies (Xie et al. 
2003; Klein 2002; Peasnell et al. 2000) have indicated that corporate governance factors 
such as board independence, board expertise, board diligence, board ownership (directors’ 
stock ownership in the company) and board size, have an impact on corporate accounting 
behavior, including earnings management. Based on the assumption that expensing 
employee stock options is a good practice of accounting that improves earnings quality, it 
is hypothesized that these corporate governance factors would affect companies’ option 
expensing decisions, in similar ways as they affect companies’ other earnings management 
choices. A series of hypotheses relating to specific corporate governance factors are tested 
using empirical data. 
 
Method of Inquiry 
To address the research question of do certain board characteristics and other 
corporate governance factors affect option expensing decisions, a sample of firms that had 
elected to expense employee stock options up to early September 2003 is identified, and a 
control sample of non-expensing firms is selected based on matching industry membership 
and market capitalization. The matching principle is similar to that used in other research 
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studies (Seethamraju and Zach 2003; Aboody et al. 2003). A logit regression is conducted 
using empirical data. The dependent variable is companies’ decisions on whether or not to 
expense employee stock options. The independent variables are corporate governance 
factors and control variables. The sign and significance of the estimated coefficients are 
compared with predictions in order to test the hypotheses. 
 
Significance of the Study 
This study contributes to the accounting choice literature. SFAS 123 provides 
companies the choice between the intrinsic value method and the fair value method in 
accounting for employee stock options. Specifically, this study focuses on how corporate 
governance factors affect such choice. In the context of expensing employee stock options, 
the question is even more interesting since the employee stock option itself, the subject of 
the accounting choice question, is related to corporate governance issues. As a component 
of director and executive compensation, employee stock options play an important role in 
corporate governance. 
Prior studies (Aboody et al. 2003; Ferri et al. 2003; Seethamraju and Zach 2003) 
limited their investigation of corporate governance to factors such as proportion of outside 
directors on the board, board ownership, etc.. The results were inconclusive. This study 
expands the variable set to include other corporate governance factors such as directors’ 
tenure, board expertise, board diligence, etc., and retests those factors with inconclusive 
results. This study focuses solely on corporate governance related factors. This allows a 
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more detailed study on the impact of corporate governance related factors on companies’ 
expensing decisions. 
 
Organization of the Study 
The organization of this dissertation is as follows: Chapter one discusses the 
employee stock option and its usage in practice, accounting for employee stock options, 
the basic assumption, objective of the study, method of inquiry, and significance of the 
study. Chapter two reviews prior literature on the impact of corporate governance factors 
on corporate behavior, mainly accounting choices, including earnings management. A 
series of hypotheses are developed, each relating to one corporate governance factor. 
Chapter three presents the research design, including sample selection, data source, the 
statistical model, and econometric issues. Chapter four describes the data set, presents and 
analyzes the statistical results. And chapter five summarizes the study, discusses the 
limitations of the current study, and makes suggestions for future research. 
 
 
  
Chapter Two 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
   
 Prior research has found that companies with certain corporate governance 
characteristics had better quality earnings, and were more likely to act in shareholders’ 
interest. Based on the assumption that expensing employee stock options is a good 
accounting practice that improves earnings quality and is in compliance with shareholders’ 
interest, it is generally hypothesized in the current study that companies with these 
corporate governance characteristics are more likely to expense employee stock options. 
The same prediction has been made by Guay et al. (2003). In this chapter, previous studies 
on the impact of corporate governance factors on corporate behavior, mainly the impact on 
accounting choices, including earnings management, are reviewed. A series of hypotheses 
are developed, relating to specific corporate governance factors. These corporate 
governance factors include various board characteristics (such as board diligence, board 
ownership, board size, etc.), CEO tenure, and internal blockholders. 
 
Corporate Governance and the Board of Directors 
There are various corporate governance structures, for example, “insider 
shareholdings, institutional shareholdings, shareholdings by blockholders, the use of 
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outsiders on the board of directors, debt financing, the external labor market for managers, 
and the market for corporate control” (Agrawal and Knoeber 1996, 394). The corporate 
governance structures most relevant to this study are the board of directors and 
blockholders. Corporate governance structures can be divided into internal and external 
structures. The board of directors is one type of internal governance structure (John and 
Senbet 1998). 
The board of directors assumes two different roles: the monitoring role and the 
decision making role (Klein 1998; ABA Corporate Director’s Guidebook 2004). The 
current study is concerned with the monitoring role of the board of directors. Agency 
theory is the central theme of the stream of research related to the monitoring role of the 
board. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama (1980), agency problems are 
generated by the separation of the risk-bearing of equity owners and the management 
function. The principal bears the risk while the agent carries out the operation. The party 
that actually manages the asset does not bear the risk of potential loss due to inferior 
management. Fama and Jensen (1983) pointed out that stockholders delegate most of the 
decision and control functions to the board of directors, the board of directors then delegate 
most of its decision and control functions to the management. Thus, there are two layers of 
agency relationships. The first is between the stockholders and the board, the second is 
between the board and the management. The principal does not actually carry out the 
decision and control functions but monitors the agent’s decision and control activities. The 
board is the agent of stockholders and the principal of the management. It exerts important 
influence on corporate decisions, which should be consistent with stockholders’ interest. 
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Corporate Governance Related Factors 
Board Effectiveness 
The National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD 1996) asserted that 
director independence, diligence, and expertise are imperative to board effectiveness. 
Researchers also believe that these characteristics are related to the effectiveness of board 
monitoring (Conger et al. 1998; John and Senbet 1998; Lorsch 1995). 
In the subsequent part of this chapter, prior literature related to board characteristics 
and certain other corporate governance factors, and their effect on the corporation 
(including earnings management) is reviewed. The studies reviewed include not only board 
of directors studies, but also audit committee studies, since the audit committee studies are 
closely related to and provide insight for the current study. The characteristics of 
independence, expertise and diligence are not confined to the board of directors, but also 
are characteristics of the audit committee and other committees of the board. They are the 
most often addressed among board/committee characteristics. 
DeZoort et al. (2002) provided a review of the “empirical audit committee 
literature.” They organized the review in reference to a framework of “determinants of 
audit committee effectiveness (ACE)” (See Appendix). According to this framework, audit 
committee effectiveness is determined by various audit committee characteristics, such as 
committee independence, diligence and expertise. These characteristics and audit 
committee effectiveness compose a framework which includes input factors, process 
factors and output factors. Input factors include audit committee composition factors such 
as expertise and independence of committee members, authority factors such as the 
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committee’s responsibility and influence, and resource factors such as the committee’s 
“access to management, external and internal auditors.” The process factor is audit 
committee diligence, and the output is audit committee effectiveness. Dezoort et al. 
(2002)’s framework suggests that a similar structure would exist for the determinants of 
board effectiveness. 
Previous studies, as reviewed in this chapter, have found that board/audit 
committee characteristics and other corporate governance factors had an impact on 
corporate financial reporting choices, including earnings management. In companies with a 
more effective board, the occurrence of financial statement fraud was less likely (Beasley 
1996), and earnings manipulations leading to SEC enforcement actions were less likely 
(Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney 1996). Since whether to use the fair value method to account 
for employee stock options is a choice available to management under the provisions of 
SFAS 123, it is reasonable to hypothesize that board characteristics and other corporate 
governance factors would have a significant impact on corporate decisions on such 
choices. 
 
Board Independence 
Board independence is receiving increased attention in practice. The California 
Public Employees’ Retirement System (CALPERS) stated in its 1998 report that 
“independence is the cornerstone of accountability. It is now widely recognized throughout 
the U.S. that independent boards are essential to a sound governance structure” 
(CALPERS 1998, 4). The National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD) issued the 
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Report of the NACD Blue Ribbon Commission on Director Professionalism (NACD 1998). 
The report recommended that a substantial majority of the board should be independent, 
that independence is the key to a board’s credibility and its accountability, and that 
independent directors should control the key committees. “The NYSE [New York Stock 
Exchange] and NASD [National Association of Securities Dealers] exchanges proposed 
new rules that both mandated board independence and tightened the definition of an 
independent director” (Gillette et al. 2003, 1). In response to the recent public company 
crisis such as Enron and WorldCom, etc., the New York Stock Exchange in August of 
2002 began requiring that more than one-half of the members of the board of directors 
must be independent members and that membership on the auditing, nominating, and 
compensation committees must be entirely composed of outside directors (Fields and Keys 
2003). 
Researchers have found that a more independent board would be more likely to act 
in the interest of shareholders than in the interest of management (Cotter et al. 1997; 
Tufano and Sevick 1997; Brickley et al. 1994; Byrd and Hickman 1992; Kosnik 1987). For 
companies with more independent boards, CEO turnover was more strongly related to firm 
performance (Weisbach 1988). And the appointment of independent directors was valued 
by shareholders (Rosenstein and Wyatt 1990). Researchers (Xie et al. 2003; Klein 2002; 
Beekes et al. 2004; Peasnell et al. 2000) have also found that companies with more 
independent boards were likely to have better quality earnings. 
Since whether or not to use the fair value method to account for employee stock 
options is an accounting choice available to companies, a decision affecting reported 
 23
earnings, it is reasonable to hypothesize that this choice is likely to be influenced by board 
independence. Companies with more independent boards would be more likely to expense 
employee stock options. In this study, the alternative measures of board independence used 
in empirical testing are the percentage of independent directors on the board, CEO/board 
chairman split, and tenure of independent directors. 
 
Percentage of independent directors on the board 
Outside and inside directors may have different advantages to shareholders. 
“Outside directors may be more important on committees that handle agency issues …, 
and insiders may best use their company knowledge on committees that focus on firm-
specific issues” (Xie et al. 2003). Since the current study investigates how board 
characteristics affect corporate decisions on expensing of employee stock options, a 
decision prone to earnings/financial information management, the agency issue is the 
relevant aspect to the current study. Therefore, the greater the percentage of outside 
directors, the better the board will carry out its monitoring duties on such choices. 
Besides outside and inside directors, there exist affiliated directors (Carcello and 
Neal 2003). Affiliated directors are those directors who are not part of the management 
team, but have “strong economic or personal ties to the company or its management,” thus 
are not totally independent from the management (Carcello and Neal 2003). As stated by 
DeZoort et al. (2002), some researchers define independent director by the dichotomy of 
outside/inside directors, while more recently researchers have begun to use the 
classification of outside/affiliated/inside directors. In the current study, the latter 
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measurement of director independence is used, as in a recent study by Carcello and Neal 
(2003), where affiliated directors were categorized as non-independent. 
Researchers have found that companies having greater proportion of independent 
directors on the board were likely to have better quality earnings. Xie et al. (2003) found 
that the proportion of outside directors on the board, an indicator of board independence, 
was significantly and negatively associated with the magnitude of “discretionary current 
accruals.” Klein (2002) found that abnormal accruals were smaller for companies with 
more independent directors. Beekes et al. (2004) found that the percentage of outside 
directors on the board was positively related to the likelihood of recognizing “bad news in 
earnings on a timely basis” by UK firms. A study by Peasnell et al. (2000) found that 
certain UK firms were less likely to manage earnings upward if the boards had greater 
proportions of outside directors. 
Several previous studies have tested the relation between the percentage of 
independent directors and corporate reporting of employee stock options; however, the 
results are inconclusive. Seethamraju and Zach (2003) did not find an association between 
the percentage of outsiders serving on the board of directors and the likelihood of 
expensing options. Baker (1999) found an insignificant and negative impact of the 
proportion of inside directors on the board on the degree of discount (underreporting) in 
companies’ estimated executive stock option values in proxy statements, which, according 
to Baker (1999), is contrary to general conclusions on the impact of inside directors. In the 
current study, the effect of the percentage of independent directors on corporate reporting 
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of employee stock options is tested again. Consistent with the general conclusion that 
board independence improves earnings quality, it is hypothesized that: 
H1: A company with a board that has a greater percentage of independent members 
will be more likely to expense employee stock options. 
 
CEO/board chairman split 
Whether the board chairman is the CEO or not the CEO is a relevant issue to board 
independence. The California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CALPERS) stated in 
its 1998 report that “the independence of a majority of the board is not enough. The 
leadership of the board must embrace independence, and it must ultimately change the way 
in which directors interact with management” (CALPERS 1998, 4). 
Prior studies have found a negative impact of the power of the CEO on board 
independence, and on management decisions to act in the best interest of shareholders. 
Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) examined the director selection process, and found that 
the involvement of the CEO in the process reduced the independence of the board. They 
found that “when the CEO serves on the nominating committee …, firms appoint fewer 
independent outside directors and more gray outsiders with conflicts of interest. Stock 
price reactions to independent director appointments are significantly lower when the CEO 
is involved in director selection” (1829). Klein (2002) found “a positive relation between 
earnings management and whether the CEO sits on [the compensation] committee” (398). 
Jensen (1993) pointed out that if the board room culture discourages conflict between 
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board members and the CEO, then the board is easily to be controlled by the CEO and 
unable to exercise well its monitoring function. 
Results of these studies suggest that influence of the CEO on the board may 
negatively impact a firm’s decision to expense employee stock options. The common 
measurements of the extent of the CEO’s influence on the board used in the literature 
include “whether the CEO is also the chairman of the board” (Baker 1999; Tsui et al. 
2001) and “whether the CEO is a board member” (Aboody et al. 2003). The insignificant 
impact of “whether the CEO is a board member” on option expensing decisions found in 
the Aboody et al. (2003) study may have been caused by the lack of variation in this 
variable, since many companies are likely to have the CEO on the board, and only some 
companies are likely to have the CEO as the chairman of the board. Thus, the alternative 
measurement “whether the CEO is also the chairman of the board” is used in the current 
study. Baker (1999) found that the degree of discount (underreporting) in executive stock 
option value estimates in proxy statements tended to be greater for a company whose CEO 
was also the chairman of the board, controlling for firm size. Similar effect is expected for 
the expensing vs. non-expensing decisions, that is, as hypothesized: 
H2: A company whose CEO is also chairman of the board will be less likely to 
expense employee stock options. 
 
Tenure of independent directors 
Prior studies have indicated that the longer the independent directors’ tenure with 
the firm, the more likely they would side with management, thus their independence would 
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be impaired, and their likelihood to act in the best interest of shareholders would be 
reduced (Vafeas 2003). The “Preliminary Report of the American Bar Association Task 
Force on Corporate Responsibility” recommends rotation of directors and that public 
companies set director term limits (American Bar Association 2002). Thus, it is likely that 
the increase in independent directors’ years of tenure will negatively affect companies’ 
option expensing decisions. It is hypothesized in this study that: 
H3: A company whose independent directors have fewer years of tenure will be 
more likely to expense employee stock options. 
 
Board Expertise 
Prior studies have indicated a relation between directors’ expertise and earnings 
management. Xie et al. (2003) found a negative relation between directors’ governance and 
financial expertise and discretionary accruals, which suggests that a board composed of 
directors with more governance and financial expertise will be more likely to influence 
management to act in the best interest of shareholders on accounting choices. Thus, it is 
reasonable to hypothesize that companies that have boards with greater expertise would be 
more likely to expense employee stock options. The most relevant role of the board to the 
decision of expensing employee stock options is the monitoring instead of the advisory 
role. Since non-independent directors are not likely to be effective monitors, only 
independent directors’ governance and financial expertise are considered in the current 
study. 
 28
Extant research measures directors’ expertise by the number of outside 
directorships held (governance expertise) and directors’ background related to financial 
knowledge (financial expertise). Prior studies have indicated that the number of outside 
directorships held is a reflection of director’s governance expertise. Kaplan and Reishus 
(1990) found that executives of companies with bad performance had less chance to serve 
on other companies’ boards. Gilson (1990) found that directors who resigned due to 
bankruptcy or debt restruction subsequently held less board seats in other companies. 
Carcello et al. (2002) measured board expertise by the “number of outside directorships 
held in other corporations by non-management directors” (372). Carcello and Neal (2003) 
measured directors’ (audit committee members’) governance expertise by the average 
number of directorship positions they hold in other public companies. As in previous 
studies, in the current study, directors’ governance expertise is measured by the average 
number of directorships held in other companies by independent directors. 
Carcello and Neal (2003) used the definition of directors’ financial expertise 
provided by the Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC) on Improving the Effectiveness of 
Corporate Audit Committees, that is, “past employment experience in finance or 
accounting, requisite professional certification in accounting, or any other comparable 
experience or background which results in the individual’s financial sophistication, 
including being or having been a CEO or other senior officer with financial oversight 
responsibilities” (Blue Ribbon Committee 1999, 25). As in Carcello and Neal (2003), this 
definition is used for measurement of independent directors’ financial expertise in the 
current study. 
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The discussion above thus leads to the following hypotheses about the positive 
impact of directors’ expertise on option expensing decisions: 
H4: A company whose independent directors have more outside directorships will 
be more likely to expense employee stock options. 
H5: A company whose board has a greater percentage of independent directors with 
financial expertise will be more likely to expense employee stock options. 
 
Board Diligence 
A more diligent board makes more effort to carry out its duties, thus would be more 
likely to push management to act in shareholders’ interest, and would be more effective in 
monitoring a company’s accounting choices. Xie et al. (2003) found a negative association 
between the number of board meetings and discretional accruals. Thus, it is probable that 
companies with more diligent boards would be more likely to expense employee stock 
options. 
Board diligence is exhibited in various ways (DeZoort et al. 2002). One way is an 
active plan to improve board effectiveness. The Preliminary Report of the American Bar 
Association Task Force on Corporate Responsibility “recommends that public companies 
consider designating a lead independent director or an independent board chair, 
establishing policies to set board meeting agendas, considering policies to set term limits 
or rotate service on board committees, maintaining director training programs, and 
adopting procedures to evaluate the effectiveness of meetings, information flow, diversity 
of experience among directors and contributions of individual directors” (American Bar 
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Association 2002). Diligence is also reflected in how the board actually carries out its 
duties, and the effort of individual directors (DeZoort et al. 2002). However, due to the 
lack of data on other diligence measures, the most commonly used measure is the number 
of meetings disclosed in companies’ proxy statements (DeZoort et al. 2002). Carcello et al. 
(2002) in their study measured board diligence by the number of board meetings as 
disclosed in companies’ proxy statements. The current study uses the same measurement 
of board diligence. It is hypothesized that: 
H6: A company that has more board meetings per year will be more likely to 
expense employee stock options. 
 
Board Ownership 
DeZoort et al. (2002) suggested that researchers study the effect of directors’ stock 
ownership, which in their opinion would possibly affect directors’ desire to monitor 
management behavior. Results on the impact of directors’ and executives’ ownership in 
general are inconclusive, as indicated by prior literature. Ownership may align their 
interests with that of shareholders, if directors and executives intend to be long-term 
investors. As mentioned by John and Senbet (1998), Noe and Rebello (1996) stated that 
compensation aligns directors’ interest with that of stockholders better than directors’ 
reputation concerns. However, if directors and executives intend to be short-term investors, 
ownership may motivate them to manage earnings, since the better reported earnings, the 
higher the stock price in the short-term (Millstein 2002; Pitt 2002). Carcello and Neal 
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(2003) expressed similar opinion about the long-term versus short-term intention of 
directors (audit committee members). 
With regard to directors’ ownership specifically, previous studies have indicated 
that directors’ stock ownership in the company has an impact on their monitoring behavior. 
Some studies indicated a positive impact. Fields and Keys (2003) stated that “since 
directors do not have their human capital tied to the firm as managers do, ownership can 
motivate directors to acquire information on the firm that can be used to monitor 
management’s actions” (8). Kren and Kerr (1997) found that in companies where the 
directors’ ownership was higher, executive compensation was more strongly related with 
firm performance. Farrell and Whidbee (2000) found that ownership of outside directors 
increased their monitoring effectiveness in the situation of a “forced CEO succession.” 
However, other research indicated a negative impact of directors’ ownership on board 
monitoring. Carcello and Neal (2003) found a negative relation between directors’ (audit 
committee members’) stock ownership and their monitoring effectiveness. 
Even in the specific situation of employee stock options reporting, results on the 
impact of independent directors’ equity ownership are inconclusive. Aboody et al. (2003) 
found that the greater the “the proportion of equity held by outside directors,” the more 
likely that the company would expense employee stock options. In their examination of 
votes on option expensing proposals, Ferri et al. (2003) found “that on average, insiders’ 
ownership is positively associated to votes against expensing, suggesting at least some 
insiders might fear that expensing will limit their ability to extract excessive (option) 
compensation rents” (1). Ferri et al. (2003) defined “insiders” as “executive officers and 
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directors.” Seethamraju and Zach (2003) did not find any relation between inside/outside 
directors’ ownership and the likelihood of firms’ expensing of employee stock options. 
Baker (1999) did not find significant impact of stockholdings “by the non-CEO director 
with the largest block of ownership” on the degree of discount in option value estimates in 
proxy statements. 
Due to the inconclusive results on the impact of directors’ ownership, it is difficult 
to hypothesize the direction of such ownership on companies’ option expensing decisions. 
Thus, no direction of the impact of independent directors’ stock ownership is predicted. It 
is hypothesized that: 
H7: There is no impact of independent directors’ average stock (including stock 
options) ownership in the company on the likelihood of a company’s expensing of 
employee stock options. 
 
Board Size 
There is conflicting evidence on the effect of board size on board monitoring (Xie 
et al. 2003). Bushman et al. (2004) stated that relative to board size, smaller boards have 
the advantage of lower coordination costs and less free riding among board members; 
however, smaller boards have the disadvantage of fewer advisors and monitors of 
management. Beasley (1996) found that companies with smaller boards were less likely to 
have financial statement fraud. Xie et al. (2003) mentioned that “A smaller board may be 
less encumbered with bureaucratic problems and may be more functional. Smaller boards 
may provide better financial reporting oversight” (300). Vafeas (2000) found that for 
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companies with a smaller board, the earnings-returns relationship was stronger, indicating 
that investors perceived that these companies had better quality earnings. Baker (1999) 
found that the degree of discount (underreporting) in executive stock option value 
estimates in proxy statements was greater for companies with larger boards, controlling for 
firm size. 
On the other hand, there are arguments that a larger board is more effective in 
monitoring. Felo et al. (2003) stated that “a larger audit committee may make it more 
likely that potential problems in the financial reporting process will be uncovered and 
resolved. This could arise if a larger committee size increases the resources available to the 
audit committee and improves the quality of its oversight” (14). Likewise, a larger board 
would be more effective in monitoring because of greater availability of resources. Xie et 
al. (2003) mentioned that: “a larger board may be able to draw from a broader range of 
experience. In the case of earnings management, a larger board may be more likely to have 
independent directors with corporate or financial experience. If so, a larger board might be 
better at preventing earnings management” (300). 
In summary of previous conclusions on the impact of board size on monitoring 
effectiveness, smaller boards may be more effective in monitoring because of less 
bureaucracy, larger boards may be more effective in monitoring because of more resources 
available to carry out the monitoring function. In the current study, since the effect of 
directors’ governance and financial expertise have already been accounted for with their 
inclusion in the statistical model, the empirical test result on board size would most likely 
reflect only the bureaucracy facet of the effect. Thus, it is hypothesized that: 
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H8: A company with a smaller board will be more likely to expense employee 
stock options. 
Up to now, the corporate governance studies reviewed in this chapter are all related 
to board characteristics. In the remaining part of this chapter, studies related to other “non-
board” corporate governance factors, including CEO tenure and internal blockholders are 
reviewed, and hypotheses are developed accordingly. 
 
CEO Tenure 
CEOs’ power and control increase with the increase in years of their tenure as 
CEOs. This would impair corporate governance and thus impair shareholders’ interest. 
Based on the analysis of the change of CEOs’ power over their tenure, Shen (2003) 
proposed that “the risk of managerial opportunism is low during the early years of CEO 
tenure; however, it increases significantly after the CEO has proven his or her leadership 
on the job,” that is, in the later years of CEO tenure. Thus, it is hypothesized that: 
H9: A company where the CEO has more years of tenure will be less likely to 
expense employee stock options. 
 
Internal Blockholders 
Because of the significance of the percentage of shares held by blockholders 
(>5%), their influence on corporate governance cannot be ignored. Blockholders can be 
internal or external. Internal blockholders are executive officers and (outside) directors. 
According to prior studies, large ownership by directors, the CEO and other executive 
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officers impairs corporate governance (Denis et al. 1997; Gordon and Pound 1993). Denis 
et al. (1997) found that the likelihood of top executive turnover decreased with the increase 
in ownership by directors and officers. They stated that such ownership affects efforts of 
internal monitoring. Gordon and Pound (1993) stated that there are different effects of 
outside directors owning more than 5% stock of the firm. The significance of the 
ownership may motivate them to monitor the company more effectively. While on the 
other hand, since “most outside directors who are blockholders attain their ownership and 
board positions in friendly transactions with management,” such outside director-
blockholders are likely to “side with management” in their voting on shareholder proposals 
(Gordon and Pound 1993, 708). The findings of Gordon and Pound (1993) support the 
latter argument. Thus, it is likely that ownership by internal blockholders (executive 
officers and outside directors) will impair corporate governance. It is hypothesized that: 
H10: A company with greater percentage of cumulative internal blockholder (>5%) 
ownership will be less likely to expense employee stock options. 
Because of the significant influence of the CEO on corporate decisions, when the 
CEO is the largest blockholder, it is very likely that corporate decisions will deviate from 
shareholders’ interest. It is hypothesized that: 
H11: A company where the largest blockholder is the CEO will be less likely to 
expense employee stock options. 
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Summary 
In summary, previous studies reviewed in this chapter have found significant 
impact of various corporate governance factors on the corporation. These corporate 
governance factors include various board characteristics and other non-board governance 
factors (CEO tenure and internal blockholders). The board characteristics studies include 
those related to board independence, board expertise, board diligence, board ownership and 
board size. It is based on the conclusions of these studies that similar impact of these 
corporate governance factors on option expensing decisions is hypothesized. The following 
table lists the major studies reviewed in this chapter that are related to the various 
corporate governance factors: 
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Table 2-1 
SUMMARY OF MAJOR STUDIES RELATED TO CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FACTORS 
Corporate Governance Factors Previous Studies Main Conclusions 
Xie et al. (2003) Xie et al. (2003) found that the proportion of outside directors on the 
board, an indicator of board independence was significantly and 
negatively associated with the magnitude of “discretionary current 
accruals.”  
 
Klein (2002) Klein (2002) found that abnormal accruals were less for companies with 
more independent directors. 
 
Beekes et al. (2004) Beekes et al. (2004) found that the percentage of outside directors on the 
board was positively related to the likelihood of recognizing “bad news in 
earnings on a timely basis” by UK firms. 
 
Peasnell et al. (2000) Peasnell et al. (2000) found that certain UK firms were less likely to 
manage earnings upward if the boards had greater proportions of outside 
directors. 
 
Seethamraju and 
Zach (2003) 
Seethamraju and Zach (2003) did not find an association between the 
percentage of outsiders serving on the board of directors and the 
likelihood of expensing options. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Percentage of 
independent 
directors on the 
board 
Baker (1999) Baker (1999) found an insignificant and negative impact of the proportion 
of inside directors on the board on the degree of discount (underreporting) 
in companies’ estimated executive stock option values in proxy 
statements, which, according to Baker (1999), is contrary to general 
conclusions on the impact of inside directors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Board 
Independence 
 
 
 
 
CEO/board 
chairman split 
Baker (1999) Baker (1999) found that the degree of discount (underreporting) in 
executive stock option value estimates in proxy statements tended to be 
greater for a company whose CEO was also the chairman of the board, 
controlling for firm size. 
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Table 2-1 (Continued) 
SUMMARY OF MAJOR STUDIES RELATED TO CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FACTORS 
Corporate Governance Factors Previous Studies Main Conclusions 
 
Board 
Independence 
(Continued) 
 
Tenure of 
independent 
directors 
Vafeas (2003) Vafeas (2003) indicated that the longer the independent directors’ tenure 
with the firm, the more likely they would side with management, and thus 
their independence would be impaired, and their likelihood to act in the 
best interest of shareholders would be reduced. 
 
Board 
Expertise 
 Xie et al. (2003) Xie et al. (2003) found a negative relation between directors’ governance 
and financial expertise and discretionary accruals. 
 
Board 
Diligence 
 Xie et al. (2003) Xie et al. (2003) found a negative association between the number of 
board meetings and discretional accruals. 
 
Kren and Kerr (1997) Kren and Kerr (1997) found that in companies where the directors’ 
ownership was higher, executive compensation was more strongly related 
with firm performance. 
 
Farrell and Whidbee 
(2000) 
Farrell and Whidbee (2000) found that ownership of outside directors 
increased their monitoring effectiveness in the situation of a “forced CEO 
succession.” 
 
Carcello and Neal 
(2003) 
Carcello and Neal’s (2003) study indicated the negative impact of 
directors’ (audit committee members’) stock ownership on directors’ 
monitoring effectiveness. 
 
Aboody et al. (2003) Aboody et al. (2003) found that the greater the “the proportion of equity 
held by outside directors,” the more likely that the company would 
expense employee stock options. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Board 
Ownership 
 
Ferri et al. (2003) In their examination of votes on option expensing proposals, Ferri et al. 
(2003) found “that on average, insiders’ ownership is positively 
associated to votes against expensing.” 
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Table 2-1 (Continued) 
SUMMARY OF MAJOR STUDIES RELATED TO CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FACTORS 
Corporate Governance Factors Previous Studies Main Conclusions 
Beasley (1996) Beasley (1996) found that companies with smaller boards were less likely 
to have financial statement fraud. 
 
Vafeas (2000) Vafeas (2000) found that for companies with a smaller board, the 
earnings-returns relationship was stronger, indicating that investors 
perceived that these companies had better quality earnings. 
 
 
 
 
Board Size 
 
Baker (1999) Baker (1999) found that the degree of discount (underreporting) in 
executive stock option value estimates in proxy statements was greater 
for companies with larger boards, controlling for firm size. 
 
 
 
CEO Tenure 
 
 
Shen (2003) 
 
 
Based on the analysis of the change of CEOs’ power over their tenure, 
Shen (2003) proposed that “the risk of managerial opportunism is low 
during the early years of CEO tenure; however, it increases significantly 
after the CEO has proven his or her leadership on the job,” that is, in the 
later years of CEO tenure. 
 
Denis et al. (1997) Denis et al. (1997) found that the likelihood of top executive turnover 
decreased with the increase in ownership by directors and officers. 
 
 
 
Internal 
Blockholders 
 
Gordon and Pound 
(1993) 
Gordon and Pound (1993) found that outside directors owning more than 
5% stock of the firm were likely to “side with management” in their 
voting on shareholder proposals. 
 
 
  
Chapter Three 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
 
 
Sample Selection and Data Source 
Included in the sample for this study are a set of firms that have elected to expense 
employee stock options and a control sample. The set of 356 firms that announced their 
intention to recognize employee stock options as a compensation expense is identified 
from a report compiled by Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc. (2003).3
According to this report, 101 (28%) of the 356 firms are S&P 500 firms. This accounts for 
“20% of the index based on number of companies and 39% of the index based on market 
capitalization.” These 356 firms had either expensed or expressed their intention to 
expense employee stock options by the report date of September 4, 2003. The authors of 
the report anticipated that more companies would join the option expensing group in the 
remaining three months of 2003 because of the likelihood of FASB issuing a standard in 
early 2004 mandating expensing, and because of a favorable prospective transition method 
(which limited the application of the fair value method to option grants in the current and 
subsequent years only) permitted under SFAS 148, which only applies to companies 
                                                 
3 Ferri et al. (2003) mention that: “A list of voluntary expensers and announcement dates compiled 
by Bear Stearns & Co. is available on the web site www.thecorporatelibrary.com” (Ferri et al. 2003, p.20). 
From the website www.thecorporatelibrary.com, search “Bear Stearns & Co.” The PDF file 
“ExpensingStockOptions09-4-03” is among the search results. The 356 option expensing firms included in 
Appendix A of this report are selected for the current study. 
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adopting the fair value method in fiscal years starting before December 16, 2003. The 
current study uses the report date September 4, 2003 as the cutoff date for sample 
selection. This excludes confounding factors that induced companies to rush to expense 
employee stock options, and makes the selected sample better for testing the impact of 
corporate governance factors on option expensing decisions. 
The matching sample is selected from the S&P 500, S&P 400 mid-capitalization, 
and S&P 600 small-capitalization firms from the Research Insight (COMPUSTAT) 
database. The matching principle is similar to those used in previous studies (Seethamraju 
and Zach 2003; Aboody et al. 2003). The procedure followed in selecting the matching 
sample is as follows: (1) For each firm that elected to expense employee stock options, a 
matching firm that did not choose to do so is identified. (2) The matching firm should be in 
the same industry as the expensing firm, that is, they have the same four-digit SIC codes. If 
a matching firm with the same four-digit SIC code cannot be found, a firm with the same 
three-digit SIC code is identified. If this is still not possible, then the two-digit SIC code is 
used. (3) The matching firm should also have similar market capitalization as the 
expensing firm, that is, the market capitalization should not be below or above 20 percent 
of that of the expensing firm. The market capitalization used is the average of the 
beginning and end of the announcement year for an option expensing company, and is the 
same for the matching company that did not choose to expense options. Companies 
selected to the matching sample are checked to ascertain that they did not elect to expense 
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employee stock options after September 4, 2003.4 If a company in the matching sample has 
become an option expensing company, another company that meets the matching criteria 
was identified. 
The initial sample is composed of 356 expensing firms, for which a matching 
control sample is selected. Data on corporate governance factors are collected from their 
proxy statements.5 “Schedule 14A (the proxy statement) requires firms to disclose each 
director’s name, business experience during the last 5 years, other current directorships, 
family relationships between any director, nominee or executive officer, significant current 
or proposed transactions with management, ‘significant business relations’ with the firm 
and number of shares held” (Klein 2002, 380). The date of the proxy statement used for 
each expensing company is the one that most closely precedes the date that the company 
announced the stock option expensing decision. Such “announcement date” is indicated by 
the Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc. report (2003). The date of the proxy statement used for the 
matching company is the same as that for the expensing company. 
 
Statistical Model 
The following logistic regression model (equation 1) is estimated using the SPSS 
statistical program. A logistic instead of linear regression will be used since the dependent 
variable is a discrete choice variable with values of one or zero. 
                                                 
4 Search companies’ annual reports and news announcements from the Lexis-Nexis Academic 
database, and from the Factiva database. 
 
5 Proxy statements are searched from the EDGAR database, or if not available from EDGAR, from 
the Lexis-Nexis Academic database. 
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EXPDEC = α + β1INDPNT + β2CEOCHR + β3DIRTNR + β4DIRSHP +  
                               β5FINEXP + β6MEETING + β7STOCK + β8BRDSIZE +          
          β 9CEOTNR + β10INTBLK + β11CEOBLK + β12SIZE+  
         β13PUB + β14OPTEXP + β15RET12 + β16RET123 +  
         β17RISK + β18GROWTH + β19LEVERAGE + ε                          (1) 
 EXPDEC is the company’s decision on whether to expense employee stock 
options. This variable is coded one if the company elected to expense employee stock 
options, and coded zero if the company chose not to do so. 
INDPNT is the percentage of independent directors on the full board. Independent 
directors are neither management directors nor affiliated directors. The definition of 
affiliated directors is the same as that used in the study by Carcello and Neal (2003), that 
is, directors “who have strong economic or personal ties to the company or its management 
… [which] include current or former officers or employees of the company or of a related 
entity, relatives of management, professional advisors to the company (e.g., consultants, 
bank officers, legal counsel), officers of significant suppliers or customers of the company, 
and interlocking directors” (97). It is predicted that the estimated coefficient of this 
variable will have a positive sign. 
CEOCHR is a variable that represents whether the CEO is chairman of the board, 
which is coded one if yes, and zero if no. It is predicted that the estimated coefficient of 
this variable will have a negative sign. 
DIRTNR is the independent directors’ average years of tenure on the board. The 
estimated coefficient of this variable is predicted to have a negative sign. 
DIRSHP is the average number of outside directorships held by independent 
directors. The estimated coefficient of this variable is predicted to have a positive sign. 
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FINEXP is the percentage (relative to the full board) of independent directors with 
financial expertise. Financial expertise is defined as “past employment experience in 
finance or accounting, requisite professional certification in accounting, or any other 
comparable experience or background which results in the individual’s financial 
sophistication, including being or having been a CEO or other senior officer with financial 
oversight responsibilities” (Blue Ribbon Committee 1999, 25). The estimated coefficient 
of this variable is predicted to have a positive sign. 
MEETING is the number of board meetings in the year. The estimated coefficient 
of this variable is predicted to have a positive sign. 
STOCK is independent directors’ average stock ownership (including stock 
options). As in Carcello and Neal (2003), independent directors’ stock ownership is 
measured by the average percentage of common stock (including stock options) held by 
the independent directors. There is no predicted sign of the estimated coefficient of this 
variable. 
BRDSIZE is the number of directors on the board. The estimated coefficient of this 
variable is predicted to have a negative sign. 
CEOTNR is the CEO’s tenure in the firm. The estimated coefficient of this variable 
is predicted to have a negative sign. 
INTBLK is internal blockholders’ cumulative ownership percentage in the firm. 
The estimated coefficient of this variable is predicted to have a negative sign. 
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CEOBLK represents whether the largest blockholder is the CEO, which is coded 
one if yes, and zero if no. The estimated coefficient of this variable is predicted to have a 
negative sign. 
 
Control Variables 
In addition, the study includes SIZE, PUB, OPTEXP, RET12, RET123, RISK, 
GROWTH and LEVERAGE in the main equation (equation 1) as control variables, based 
on insights from previous studies as follows. 
 
Firm Size 
Previous studies have included firm size as one of the factors related to companies’ 
decisions on whether or not to expense options. Aboody et al. (2003) found a positive 
impact of firm size on the likelihood of companies’ expensing of employee stock options. 
Ferri et al. (2003) found that in larger companies, shareholders were more likely to vote 
“FOR” proposals of expensing of employee stock options. Seethamraju and Zach (2003) 
found that larger companies were more likely to expense employee stock options. 
The reasons provided in these studies (Aboody et al. 2003; Ferri et al. 2003; 
Seethamraju and Zach 2003) for the positive impact of firm size are as follows: Larger 
firms are more likely to have larger earnings (in absence of expensing employee stock 
options), thus, expensing employee stock options will not have significant negative impact 
on their earnings; instead, the slight reduction in earnings will mitigate political costs for 
these firms. For larger companies, information about employee stock option compensation 
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has most likely already been reflected in their stock prices, thus the recognition of such 
expense would not provide additional information to the capital market, and therefore 
would not affect the companies’ stock prices (Aboody et al. 2003; Ferri et al. 2003). 
Because of the publicity effect, recognizing employee stock options compensation expense 
would signal higher quality earnings for larger firms, thus would improve their investor 
relations (Aboody et al. 2003; Ferri et al. 2003; Seethamraju and Zach 2003). 
Aboody et al. (2003) measured firm size by the log of market value of equity. Ferri 
et al. (2003) measured firm size by the log of total assets. Seethamraju and Zach (2003) 
measured firm size by the log of market capitalization. In the current study, company size 
is measured by the log of market value of equity, as in the Aboody et al. (2003) and 
Seethamraju and Zach (2003) studies. The reason for this choice is that, for companies 
with greater total assets caused by a high leverage, the expensing decisions may be partly 
due to the intention to reduce the debt-to-equity ratio, as shown by the results of the 
Aboody et al. (2003) study. If the log of total assets is used, the leverage reduction 
motivation may confound the political effect motivation related to firm size, and cause the 
estimated coefficient to be insignificant. The estimated coefficient of this control variable 
is predicted to have a positive sign. 
 
Publicity 
Seethamraju and Zach (2003) found that the greater the public attention a company 
received, the more likely the company would expense employee stock options. They found 
that most of the impact of company size on option expensing decisions was attributable to 
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the publicity effect. When the publicity variable was added to their model, the size variable 
became insignificant. The current study includes the variable “PUB” (publicity) from their 
study as a control variable. The measurement of this variable is similar to that used in the 
Seethamraju and Zach (2003) study, that is, the log of the number of articles mentioning 
the company in the headline or lead paragraph in The Wall Street Journal in the year 
preceding the year of announcement of option expensing decisions. The estimated 
coefficient of this control variable is predicted to have a positive sign. 
 
Option Expense 
The amount of option expense is one of the most important factors that affect 
firms’ decisions on stock option expensing. Previous studies (Aboody et al. 2003; Ferri et 
al. 2003; Seethamraju and Zach 2003) have found that the greater such expense, the less 
likely that firms would expense stock options, due to the greater impact on the earnings. In 
the current study, the amount of option expense (OPTEXP) is included as a control 
variable. It is measured in a similar way as in previous studies (Aboody et al. 2003; Ferri et 
al. 2003), by option expense deflated by market value of equity. Option expense is the 
difference between net earnings and SFAS 123 pro forma earnings disclosed in financial 
statement footnotes. The estimated coefficient of this control variable is predicted to have a 
negative sign. 
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Ret12 
 The variable “RET12” in Seethamraju and Zach’s (2003) study is also included in 
the current study as a control variable. In the current study, “RET12” is “the size-adjusted 
return on sample firms’ stock” (Seethamraju and Zach 2003) in the fiscal year preceding 
the year of announcement of the option expensing decision. Seethamraju and Zach (2003) 
predicted both a positive and a negative impact for this variable. The positive prediction is 
based on the reasoning that the stronger a firm is financially, the more likely the firm can 
endure the burden of expensing options. The negative prediction is based on the reasoning 
that a firm with worse past stock performance would be more motivated to signal through 
expensing employee stock options. In the current study, no prediction is made about the 
sign of the estimated coefficient of this variable. 
 
Ret123 
Seethamraju and Zach (2003) found that the variable “RET123,” “the three-day 
size-adjusted return around January 21, 1992, the date on which FASB announced its 
intention to undertake a project requiring firms to expense stock option compensation” had 
a significant positive impact on option expensing decisions. Their interpretation was that, 
for some firms, expensing of employee stock options was perceived as good news by the 
market. For other firms, option expensing was perceived as bad news. The former would 
be more likely to expense employee stock options, while the latter would be less likely to 
do so. The variable “RET123” is also included in the current study as a control variable. 
The estimated coefficient of this control variable is predicted to have a positive sign. 
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Risk 
In the current study, risk is measured by the “beta” of the firm’s stock. The greater 
the “beta,” the riskier the firm’s stock. A “beta” of 1 indicates that the firm’s stock is as 
risky as the average in the whole market; a “beta” above 1 indicates that the firm’s stock is 
riskier than the market; while a “beta” below 1 indicates that the firm’s stock is less risky 
than the market. There is no prediction about the sign of the estimated coefficient of this 
variable. 
 
Growth 
According to researchers and practitioners (Aboody et al. 2003; Borrus et al. 2002; 
Ferri et al. 2003; Grey et al. 2002; Ittner et al. 2003; Seethamraju and Zach 2003), high 
growth firms such as many high-tech firms use employee stock options heavily, which 
makes them more reluctant than other firms to expense employee stock options, since 
recognizing the expense would have a greater impact on earnings. Thus “Growth” is 
included as a control variable. Seethamraju and Zach (2003) tested the impact of the 
“book-to-market ratio” on option expensing decisions, and found that the impact was 
insignificant. In the current study, growth is measured by the book-to-market ratio. The 
estimated coefficient of this variable is predicted to have a positive sign. 
 
Leverage 
Leverage has also been found to be positively related to companies’ decisions to 
recognize employee stock options expense (Aboody et al. 2003; Seethamraju and Zach 
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2003). Companies with higher leverage ratios have more concerns about violating debt 
covenants, and thus are more likely to recognize employee stock options expense, since 
such recognition would lower the leverage ratio (Aboody et al. 2003). In the current study, 
leverage is measured by the debt-to-equity ratio, as in the study by Aboody et al. (2003). 
The estimated coefficient of this variable is predicted to have a positive sign. 
 
Data on the control variables SIZE, RISK, GROWTH and LEVERAGE are 
collected from the Research Insight (COMPUSTAT) database. For the control variable 
OPTEXP, data on net earnings and SFAS 123 pro forma earnings is collected from 
companies’ 10-K and annual reports, and data on market value of equity is collected from 
COMPUSTAT. The year of the data used for each expensing company is the year 
preceding the year of announcement of the expensing decision. The announcement date is 
indicated by the Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc. report (2003). The year used for each matching 
company is the same as that for the expensing company. 
 The following table summarizes the predicted signs, definitions, 
coding/measurements, and data sources of all variables used in the study. 
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Table 3-1 
DESCRIPTIONS OF VARIABLES 
Variable Predicted 
Sign 
Description 
(Definition, coding/measurement, and data source.) 
 
 
EXPDEC 
 The company’s decision on whether to expense employee 
stock options. Coded one if the company elected to expense 
employee stock options, and coded zero if the company chose 
not to do so. Data mainly from Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc. 2003 
report. 
 
 
INDPNT 
 
+ 
The percentage of independent directors on the full board. 
Measured by dividing the number of independent directors by 
the total number of directors on the board. Data from proxy 
statements. 
 
 
CEOCHR 
 
- 
A variable that represents whether the CEO is chairman of the 
board. Coded one if yes, and zero if no. Data from proxy 
statements.  
 
 
DIRTNR 
 
- 
Independent directors’ average years of tenure on the board. 
Measured by dividing the total number of years in tenure of all 
directors by the total number of directors. Data from proxy 
statements. 
 
 
DIRSHP 
 
+ 
The average number of outside directorships held by 
independent directors. Measured by dividing the total number 
of outside directorships held by all independent directors by 
the number of independent directors. Data from proxy 
statements. 
 
 
 
FINEXP 
 
 
+ 
The percentage of independent directors (relative to the full 
board) who have financial expertise as defined by the Blue 
Ribbon Committee (1999). Measured by dividing the number 
of independent directors with financial expertise by the total 
number of directors. Data from proxy statements. 
 
MEETING + The number of board meetings in the year. Data from proxy 
statements.  
 
 
STOCK 
 Independent directors’ average stock ownership (including 
stock options). Measured by the average percentage of 
common stock (including stock options) held by the 
independent directors. Data from proxy statements. 
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Table 3-1 (Continued) 
DESCRIPTIONS OF VARIABLES 
Variable Predicted 
Sign 
Description 
(Definition, coding/measurement, and data source.) 
BRDSIZE - The number of directors on the board. Data from proxy 
statements. 
 
 
CEOTNR 
 
- 
The CEO’s tenure in the firm. Measured by years. Data from 
proxy statements.  
 
 
INTBLK 
 
 
- 
Internal blockholders’ cumulative ownership percentage in the 
firm. Measured by the total percentage of outstanding shares 
held by internal blockholders. Data from proxy statements. 
 
 
CEOBLK 
 
- 
A variable that represents whether the largest blockholder 
(shareholder of at least 5% of the company’s total outstanding 
shares) is the CEO. Coded one if yes, and zero if no. Data 
from proxy statements. 
 
SIZE + Firm size. Measured by the log of market value of equity (in 
units of thousand dollars). Data from COMPUSTAT. 
 
 
 
PUB 
 
 
+ 
Publicity. Measured by the log of the number of articles 
mentioning the company in the headline or lead paragraph in 
The Wall Street Journal in the year preceding the year of 
announcement of option expensing decisions. Data from the 
Factiva database. 
 
 
 
OPTEXP 
 
 
- 
The amount of option expense (in units of thousand dollars) 
deflated by market value of equity (in units of thousand 
dollars). Option expense is the difference between net earnings 
and SFAS 123 pro forma earnings disclosed in financial 
statement footnotes. Data from 10-K and annual report (net 
earnings and SFAS 123 pro forma earnings) and 
COMPUSTAT (market value of equity). 
 
 
RET12 
 “The size-adjusted return on sample firms’ stock” 
(Seethamraju and Zach 2003) in the fiscal year preceding the 
year of announcement of the option expensing decision. Data 
from COMPUSTAT. 
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Table 3-1 (Continued) 
DESCRIPTIONS OF VARIABLES 
Variable Predicted 
Sign 
Description 
(Definition, coding/measurement, and data source.) 
 
 
RET123 
 
 
+ 
“The three-day size-adjusted return around January 21, 1992, 
the date on which FASB announced its intention to undertake 
a project requiring firms to expense stock option 
compensation” (Seethamraju and Zach 2003). Data from 
CRSP. 
 
RISK  Firm risk. Measured by “beta” of the firm’s stock. Data from 
COMPUSTAT. 
 
 
GROWTH 
 
+ 
Growth of the firm. Measured by the book-to-market ratio. 
Data from COMPUSTAT. 
 
 
LEVERAGE 
 
+ 
Leverage of the firm. Measured by debt-to-equity ratio. Data 
from COMPUSTAT. 
 
 
Econometric Issues 
The Endogeneity of Corporate Governance Factors 
In their review of theoretical and empirical literature of corporate governance, with 
an emphasis on those related to agency problems and the board of directors, John and 
Senbet (1998) discussed an emerging line of research that addresses the endogeneity of 
corporate governance factors, which includes the interaction and co-determination between 
board composition and management (such as CEO tenure), and between “board 
composition and compensation.” Based on the insight from the John and Senbet (1998) 
study, the possible endogeneity among the corporate governance variables are as follows: 
it is possible that independent directors’ stock ownership is influenced by other board 
characteristics; that internal blockholders’ cumulative ownership is influenced by board 
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characteristics; and that CEO tenure is influenced by board characteristics. Similarly, the 
study of Grey et al. (2002) suggests possible co-determination between the option 
expensing decision and directors’ stock ownership. The above suggests that the 
endogeneity problem may impair the validity of the regression results if not controlled for. 
Because of the difficulty of finding instrumental variables to mitigate the potential 
endogeneity problem, the regression model (equation 1) is estimated based on the 
assumption that the variables in the equation are strictly exogenous, that is, as if they are 
randomly assigned, and that there is no omitted variable bias. 
 
Multicollinearity 
Even if as assumed, that there is no endogeneity problem, correlations among the 
variables may lead to multicollinearity, that is, the standard errors will be large. A study by 
Carcello and Neal (2003) similarly examined a series of audit committee characteristic 
variables, such as audit committee members’ independence, corporate governance 
expertise, financial expertise, equity ownership, etc. They found that the correlations 
among the variables were modest. The correlations among the variables will be examined 
in the next chapter of the current study. 
This chapter discusses research design issues such as sample selection, data source, 
statistical model, and econometric concerns. The initial sample is composed of 356 firms 
that elected to expense employee stock options, for which a control sample of non-
expensing firms is selected. The data are collected from Research Insight (COMPUSTAT), 
CRSP, Factiva, financial statement footnotes, and proxy statements of the firms. Logistic 
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regression is used to estimate the statistical model. The following chapter describes the 
actual data and analyzes the results. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Four 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
Data Description and Discussion 
As discussed in Table 3-1 Descriptions of Variables (Chapter 3, page 51), data for 
this study are collected from the following sources. Corporate governance data (INDPNT, 
CEOCHR, DIRTNR, DIRSHP, FINEXP, MEETING, STOCK, BRDSIZE, CEOTNR, 
INTBLK, CEOBLK) are collected from companies’ proxy statements. Data on publicity 
(PUB) are collected from Factiva. Data on option expense (for calculation of OPTEXP) are 
collected from companies’ 10-K and annual reports. Data on stock price for computing 
stock return around the specific event date (RET123) are collected from CRSP. Data on 
other variables (SIZE, RET12, RISK, GROWTH, LEVERAGE) are collected from 
Research Insight. 
The initial sample of 356 expensing firms is reduced due to the unavailability of 
data for some expensing firms in Research Insight, and the unavailability of proxy 
statements for some expensing firms. In addition, matching control firms for some 
expensing firms could not be identified, particularly in cases where in some SIC code 
groups a large number of firms chose to expense options. Table 4-1 illustrates the sample 
selection process. The final sample consists of 235 expensing firms and 235 matched 
control firms, 470 firms in total. Stock price data for computing RET123 is only available 
56 
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for 245 firms due to the fact that many firms did not exist or were not traded on a stock 
exchange on the event date January 21, 1992, “the date on which FASB announced its 
intention to undertake a project requiring firms to expense stock option compensation” 
(Seethamraju and Zach 2003). Data on pro forma option expense (OPTEXP) was only 
available for 400 firms, since other firms did not disclose such information in their 10-K or 
annual reports, or their 10-K or annual reports for the specific year were not available. For 
the remaining variables, data are available for most of the firms. 
 
Table 4-1 
SAMPLE SELECTION 
Procedure           No. of Firms
Initial list of expensing firms from the Bear, 
Stearns, & Co., Inc. 2003 report 
 
356 
Less firms not in Research Insight 
 
40 
Less firms for which proxy statements are 
unavailable 
 
56 
Less firms with no matching  control firms 
 
25 
Final sample of expensing firms 
 
235 
Control sample 
 
235 
Total sample 470 
 
Table 4-2a, Table 4-2b, and Table 4-2c report the descriptive statistics (number of 
observations, minimum, maximum, mean, and standard deviation) of each raw data item, 
for the full sample, expensing firms, and non-expensing firms, respectively. Most variables 
in the regression model have the same values as the raw data items, while some variables 
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were computed using the values of one or more raw data items. Certain observations for 
RISK and RET12 had values that clearly showed them to be outliers. These were deleted. 
In addition, observations with negative values for the Price to Book ratio and LEVERAGE 
were also deleted. 
The descriptive statistics show that the percentage of independent directors on the 
board (INDPNT) ranges from 12.5% to 100%. Independent directors’ average years of 
tenure (DIRTNR) ranges from 0.667 to 26 years. Independent directors’ average outside 
directorships (DIRSHP) ranges from 0 to 7. The percentage of financially-expertised 
independent directors on the board (FINEXP) ranges from 0% to 90.9%. The number of 
board meetings per year (MEETING) ranges from 1 to 28. Independent directors’ average 
stock ownership (STOCK) ranges from 0% to 20.6%. The number of directors on the 
board (BRDSIZE) ranges from 3 to 24. CEOs’ tenure ranges from 0 to 47 years. 
Cumulative ownership by internal blockholders ranges from 0% to 88.5%. And the number 
of articles mentioning the firm in the Wall Street Journal (Article Count) ranges from 0 to 
190. 
A t-test is conducted to test if the means of each raw data item of expensing firms 
are significantly different from those of non-expensing firms. The results, which are 
reported in Table 4-3, indicate that means of several corporate governance data items are 
significantly different between expensing and non-expensing firms. Independent directors 
in expensing firms hold more outside directorships (DIRSHP) than their peers in non-
expensing firms; the boards of expensing firms have greater percentages of independent 
directors with financial expertise (FINEXP) than the boards of non-expensing firms; the 
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CEOs of expensing firms have fewer years of tenure (CEOTNR) than their peers in non-
expensing firms; and the CEOs of expensing firms are less likely to be the largest 
blockholder (CEOBLK) than their peers in non-expensing firms. Means of the remaining 
corporate governance-related data items INDPNT (percentage of independent directors on 
the board), CEOCHR (whether the CEO is board chairman), DIRTNR (independent 
directors’ average years of tenure), MEETING (number of board meetings per year), 
STOCK (independent directors’ average stock ownership in the firm), BRDSIZE (number 
of directors on the board), and INTBLK (internal blockholders’ cumulative ownership in 
the firm) do not differ at conventional statistical levels between expensing and non-
expensing firms. In addition, it is seen that expensing firms are larger (Market Value of 
Equity) than non-expensing firms; expensing firms are less risky (RISK) than non-
expensing firms; and non-expensing firms tend to be higher-growth firms (GROWTH). 
These results, while not conclusive, show modest support for some of the hypotheses 
developed earlier. 
In the possible case of multicollinearity, the coefficient estimation, although 
unbiased, will have large standard errors. To address the concern for mulitcollinearity, 
correlations among the variables are computed. Table 4-4 reports the correlations among 
the variables, including the dependent variable and each independent variable. The results 
indicate that most of the correlations are below 0.1 in absolute value. A small number of 
correlations are above 0.3 in absolute value. The correlations above 0.5 in absolute value 
are that between INDPNT and FINEXP (0.588), that between BRDSIZE and SIZE (0.535), 
that INTBLK and CEOBLK (0.550), and that between SIZE and PUB (0.516). It is 
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understandable that larger firms (SIZE) tend to have more directors on the board 
(BRDSIZE), those firms with the CEO as the largest blockholder (CEOBLK) also tend to 
have greater cumulative ownership by internal blockholders (INTBLK), and larger firms 
(SIZE) tend to have more articles mentioning the firm in the Wall Street Journal (PUB). 
The correlation of 0.588 between INDPNT and FINEXP suggests that firms with a greater 
percentage of independent directors, which is an indicator of good corporate governance, 
also tend to have a greater percentage of financially-expertised independent directors on 
the board. 
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Table 4-2a 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR THE FULL SAMPLE 
Data Item N Minimum Maximum Mean Standard Deviation
EXPDEC 470 0 1 .50 .501 
INDPNT 467 12.5 100.0 69.596 17.5010 
CEOCHR 463 0 1 .68 .466 
DIRTNR 449 .667 26.000 7.42267 3.865229 
DIRSHP 466 .000 7.000 1.94165 1.182258 
FINEXP 466 .0 90.9 43.682 19.2221 
MEETING 461 1 28 7.75 3.847 
STOCK 460 .000 20.600 .61839 1.972493 
BRDSIZE 467 3 24 10.06 3.581 
CEOTNR 465 0 47 8.22 8.061 
INTBLK 454 .0 88.5 8.563 15.2417 
CEOBLK 455 0 1 .15 .357 
Market Value 
of Equity* 465 .749 207430.830 7924.54220 19804.809973 
Article Count*  470 0 190 8.14 20.455 
Option 
Expense* 400 -1514000.000 1043000.000 28853.93543 126224.198732 
RET12 457 -95.320 169.895 3.59714 34.862351 
RET123* 245 -.125 .182 .00114 .035007 
RISK 447 -.634 3.559 .69357 .600295 
Price to Book* 456 .000 39.418 2.46834 2.897592 
LEVERAGE 461 .000 665.615 68.12259 85.196582 
 
Please see Table 3-1 for descriptions of variables.  
* Raw values are provided here for Market Value of Equity (in thousand dollars), Article 
Count (actual number), Option Expense (in thousand dollars), and Price to Book. 
Transformations as shown below are used for the regression analysis. 
PUB = natural log of Article Count 
OPTEXP = Option Expense / Market Value of Equity 
SIZE = natural log of Market Value of Equity 
GROWTH = 1 / (Price to Book) 
RET123 = {[(High 6 + Low 6)/2]/ [(High 4 + Low 4)/2]}-1. (The following stock price 
data were collected from CRSP, and were used to compute the variable RET123: HIGH4 
is highest stock price on January 20, 1992; HIGH5 is highest stock price on January 21, 
1992; HIGH6 is highest stock price on January 22, 1992; LOW4 is lowest stock price on 
January 20, 1992; LOW5 is lowest stock price on January 21, 1992; and LOW6 is lowest 
stock price on January 22, 1992.) 
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Table 4-2b 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR THE EXPENSING FIRMS 
Data Item N Minimum Maximum Mean Standard Deviation
EXPDEC 235 1 1 1.00 .000 
INDPNT 232 12.5 100.0 70.120 18.0287 
CEOCHR 233 0 1 .65 .477 
DIRTNR 216 .833 26.000 7.19475 3.918782 
DIRSHP 231 .000 5.333 2.10567 1.183134 
FINEXP 231 .0 90.9 46.021 19.3676 
MEETING 227 4 25 7.90 3.812 
STOCK 232 .000 17.600 .69120 2.062488 
BRDSIZE 232 3 24 10.13 3.600 
CEOTNR 232 0 47 7.41 7.560 
INTBLK 228 .0 88.5 8.951 16.1956 
CEOBLK 230 0 1 .11 .317 
Market Value 
of Equity* 235 1.233 207430.830 9500.54198 23999.582569 
Article Count* 235 0 190 9.31 23.926 
Option 
Expense* 201 -1514000.000 1043000.000 34917.24458 167720.505312 
RET12 229 -95.320 169.895 5.32742 36.415797 
RET123* 119 -.125 .182 .00262 .035693 
RISK 222 -.634 3.559 .60971 .596245 
Price To 
Book* 229 .000 10.579 2.02583 1.540743 
LEVERAGE 231 .000 523.158 70.95842 79.013254 
 
Please see Table 3-1 for descriptions of variables.  
* Raw values are provided here for Market Value of Equity (in thousand dollars), Article 
Count (actual number), Option Expense (in thousand dollars), and Price to Book. 
Transformations as shown below are used for the regression analysis. 
PUB = natural log of Article Count 
OPTEXP = Option Expense / Market Value of Equity 
SIZE = natural log of Market Value of Equity 
GROWTH = 1 / (Price to Book) 
RET123 = {[(High 6 + Low 6)/2]/ [(High 4 + Low 4)/2]}-1. (The following stock price 
data were collected from CRSP, and were used to compute the variable RET123: HIGH4 
is highest stock price on January 20, 1992; HIGH5 is highest stock price on January 21, 
1992; HIGH6 is highest stock price on January 22, 1992; LOW4 is lowest stock price on 
January 20, 1992; LOW5 is lowest stock price on January 21, 1992; and LOW6 is lowest 
stock price on January 22, 1992.) 
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Table 4-2c 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR THE NON-EXPENSING FIRMS 
Data Item N Minimum Maximum Mean Standard Deviation
EXPDEC 235 0 0 .00 .000 
INDPNT 235 20.0 93.8 69.078 16.9865 
CEOCHR 230 0 1 .71 .453 
DIRTNR 233 .667 24.750 7.63397 3.811152 
DIRSHP 235 .000 7.000 1.78041 1.161465 
FINEXP 235 .0 90.0 41.383 18.8372 
MEETING 234 1 28 7.60 3.882 
STOCK 228 .000 20.600 .54430 1.878141 
BRDSIZE 235 4 24 9.99 3.568 
CEOTNR 233 0 45 9.03 8.469 
INTBLK 226 .0 68.2 8.171 14.2400 
CEOBLK 225 0 1 .19 .391 
Market Value 
of Equity* 230 .749 95640.480 6314.28155 14178.459645 
Article Count* 235 0 110 6.98 16.231 
Option 
Expense* 199 -4020.000 624898.000 22729.68850 60142.924405 
RET12 228 -79.178 151.941 1.85926 33.218508 
RET123* 126 -.095 .167 -.00026 .034431 
RISK 225 -.393 3.049 .77632 .594052 
Price To 
Book* 227 .197 39.418 2.91475 3.756335 
LEVERAGE 230 .000 665.615 65.27442 91.069706 
 
Please see Table 3-1 for descriptions of variables.  
* Raw values are provided here for Market Value of Equity (in thousand dollars), Article 
Count (actual number), Option Expense (in thousand dollars), and Price to Book. 
Transformations as shown below are used for the regression analysis. 
PUB = natural log of Article Count 
OPTEXP = Option Expense / Market Value of Equity 
SIZE = natural log of Market Value of Equity 
GROWTH = 1 / (Price to Book) 
RET123 = {[(High 6 + Low 6)/2]/ [(High 4 + Low 4)/2]}-1. (The following stock price 
data were collected from CRSP, and were used to compute the variable RET123: HIGH4 
is highest stock price on January 20, 1992; HIGH5 is highest stock price on January 21, 
1992; HIGH6 is highest stock price on January 22, 1992; LOW4 is lowest stock price on 
January 20, 1992; LOW5 is lowest stock price on January 21, 1992; and LOW6 is lowest 
stock price on January 22, 1992.) 
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Table 4-3 
COMPARISON OF MEANS-EXPENSING FIRMS VS. NON-EXPENSING FIRMS 
 
Data Item 
 
Expensing 
Firms
Non-Expensing 
Firms
 
t-Statistic
Significance
(2-tailed)
INDPNT 70.120 69.078 0.643 0.520
CEOCHR 0.652 0.713 -1.402 0.161
DIRTNR 7.195 7.634 -1.204 0.229
DIRSHP 2.106 1.780 2.995 0.003
FINEXP 46.021 41.383 2.620 0.009
MEETING 7.899 7.603 0.826 0.409
STOCK 0.691 0.544 0.798 0.425
BRDSIZE 10.129 9.987 0.428 0.669
CEOTNR 7.409 9.026 -2.171 0.030
INTBLK 8.951 8.171 0.545 0.586
CEOBLK 0.113 0.187 -2.209 0.028
Market Value of Equity 9500.542 6314.282 1.738 0.083
Article Count 9.306 6.983 1.232 0.219
Option Expense 34917.245 22729.689 0.965 0.335
RET12 5.327 1.859 1.063 0.288
RET123 0.003 0.000 0.643 0.521
RISK 0.610 0.776 -2.959 0.003
Price To Book 2.026 2.915 -3.311 0.001
LEVERAGE 70.958 65.274 0.716 0.474
 
Please see Table 3-1 for descriptions of variables. 
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Table 4-4 
CORRELATION MATRIX 
 EXPDEC INDPNT CEOCHR DIRTNR DIRSHP FINEXP MEETING STOCK BRDSIZE CEOTNR INTBLK CEOBLK SIZE PUB OPTEXP RET12 RET123 RISK GROWTH LEVERAGE
EXPDEC  1.00                  0   
INDPNT  0.030  1.000                   
CEOCHR -0.065  0.115*  1.000                  
DIRTNR -0.057  0.060  0.047  1.000                 
DIRSHP
 
0.138**  0.257**  0.045 -0.082  1.000                
FINEXP
 
0.121**                0.588**  0.081
-
0.148**  0.443**  1.000   
MEETING  0.039  0.048 -0.073 -0.067  0.010 -0.032  1.000              
STOCK  0.037 -0.067 -0.129 -0.043  0.016  0.022  0.063  1.000             
BRDSIZE  0.020  0.264**  0.042 
 
0.129**  0.137**  0.067  0.071 
-
0.204**  1.000            
CEOTNR -0.100*             -0.097*  0.336
 
0.184** -0.169** -0.152** -0.059 -0.019 -0.022  1.000 
INTBLK  0.026 -0.331** -0.002 
-
0.132**              -0.091 -0.167** -0.050 0.422**
-
0.227**  0.194** 1.000 
CEOBLK -0.103*                -0.226**  0.148 -0.084 -0.134** -0.093* -0.015  0.023
-
0.147**  0.375** 0.550**  1.000 
SIZE  0.061  0.315**  0.212  0.149*  0.437**  0.254**  0.042 
-
0.248**          0.535**  0.009
-
0.263** -0.099  1.000 
PUB  0.017  0.214**  0.073  0.056  0.294**  0.129**  0.076 -0.081 0.231**  0.015 
-
0.139** -0.121  0.516  1.000       
OPTEXP -0.052                    -0.053  0.031 -0.035 -0.066 -0.116* -0.034 -0.005 -0.035 -0.035  0.025 0.117* -0.112* -0.067  1.000
RET12  0.050 -0.034 -0.049  0.076 -0.061 -0.044 -0.026  0.064 -0.040  0.041  0.072  0.035 -0.027 -0.077 -0.107*  1.000     
RET123  0.041  0.017 -0.131*  0.114 -0.053  0.043 -0.027 0.213** -0.073  0.012 -0.002 -0.046 -0.069 -0.055  0.027 -0.094 1.000    
RISK
-
0.139** -0.048  0.079 -0.159  0.170**  0.007 0.131** -0.046  0.023  0.005  0.069 0.169**  0.198**  0.179**  0.140** 
-
0.346**     -0.029 1.000
GROWTH  0.060 -0.041 -0.044 -0.113 -0.128** -0.049  0.021  0.051 -0.110* -0.001  0.014 -0.021 -0.372** -0.135** -0.005 
-
0.214**     -0.009 0.026 1.000
LEVERAGE  0.033  0.083  0.083  0.019 -0.013 -0.021 0.113*  0.016 0.154**  0.041 -0.024 -0.069  0.160**  0.015 -0.040  0.062 0.080 0.008 -0.067  
              
1.000
 
Please see Table 3-1 for descriptions of variables.   
** Correlation (Pearson correlation) is significant at the 0.01 level (2-
tailed).                
             
* Correlation (Pearson correlation) is significant at the 0.05 level (2-
tailed).   
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Empirical Results 
Table 4-5 reports the results of logistic regression including all variables in the 
model. Only 178 firms are included in the regression. The small number of valid cases is 
mostly caused by the missing data on RET123. This may have led to the statistical 
insignificance of the coefficient estimations. The Pseudo R-square for the estimation is 
16.9%. The coefficient of CEOBLK has a negative sign, as predicted, and is statistically 
significant at a level of p< 0.10. This indicates that firms with the CEO as the largest 
blockholder are less likely to expense options. The coefficient of PUB has a positive sign, 
as predicted, and is statistically significant at a level of p<0.05. This indicates that firms 
that receive more public attention are more likely to expense options. The coefficient of 
RET12 has a positive sign, and is statistically significant at a level of p<0.10. This 
indicates that the higher the return on the company’s stock in the previous year, the more 
likely the company will expense options. The coefficient of GROWTH has a positive sign, 
as predicted, with the coefficient being statistically significant at a level of p<0.05. This 
indicates that high-growth firms are less likely to expense options. The signs of all the 
remaining estimated coefficients are consistent with predictions except for the variables 
MEETING and INTBLK. To better facilitate interpretation of the estimated coefficients, 
Table 4-5 also lists the marginal effects on the probability of option expensing (the 
dependent variable) of one unit change in each corporate governance factor and control 
variable (the independent variables) from its sample mean. For example, if the average 
number of outside directorships held by independent directors increase by 1 from the 
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sample mean of 1.94, the probability of expensing options will increase by 0.010412. 
However, these results should be interpreted with caution because of the small sample size. 
Given that some observations have missing values for RET123, the model is 
estimated excluding the variable RET123. The results are reported in Table 4-6. 326 firms 
were included in the estimation. The Pseudo R-square for the estimation is 16.4%. The 
model Chi-square is 42.722, and the model is significant at p<0.01. The coefficient of 
FINEXP has a positive sign, as predicted, and is statistically significant at a level of 
p<0.05. This indicates that firms with a greater percentage of independent directors with 
financial expertise are more likely to expense options. The coefficient of MEETING has a 
positive sign, as predicted, and is statistically significant at a level of p<0.10. This 
indicates that firms with more board meetings are more likely to expense options. The 
coefficient of INTBLK has a positive sign, which is contrary to the prediction. The 
estimate is significant at a level of p<0.05. This indicates that firms with greater 
cumulative internal blockholder ownership are more likely to expense options. The 
coefficient of CEOBLK has a negative sign, as predicted, and is statistically significant at a 
level of p<0.05. This indicates that firms with the CEO as the largest blockholder are less 
likely to expense options. The coefficient of SIZE has a positive sign, as predicted, and is 
statistically significant at a level of p<0.05. This indicates that larger firms are more likely 
to expense options. The coefficient of RISK has a negative sign, and is statistically 
significant at a level of p<0.10. This indicates that riskier firms are less likely to expense 
options. The coefficient of GROWTH has a positive sign, as predicted, and is statistically 
significant at a level of p<0.05. This indicates that high-growth firms are less likely to 
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expense options. To better facilitate interpretation of the estimated coefficients, Table 4-6 
also lists the marginal effects on the probability of option expensing (the dependent 
variable) of one unit change in each corporate governance factor and control variable (the 
independent variables) from its sample mean. For example, if the number of board meeting 
increases by 1 from the sample mean of 7.75, the probability of expensing options will 
increase by 0.006506. 
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Table 4-5 
SUMMARY OF REGRESSION RESULTS INCLUDING ALL VARIABLES 
 
Variable
Predicted 
Sign
Estimated 
Coefficient
Standard 
Error
Wald 
Statistic
 
Significance
Marginal 
Effect
INDPNT + -0.00256 0.015 0.031        0.860 -0.000463
CEOCHR - -0.13852 0.408 0.115        0.734 -0.000251
DIRTNR - -0.00785 0.049 0.026        0.873 -0.001424
DIRSHP + 0.05842 0.179 0.107        0.744 0.010412
FINEXP + 0.01472 0.013 1.366        0.242 0.002654
MEETING + -0.00911 0.050 0.033        0.855 -0.001654
STOCK  0.04403 0.143 0.095        0.758 0.007879
BRDSIZE - -0.00618 0.069 0.008        0.928 -0.001121
CEOTNR - -0.00481 0.024 0.040        0.842 -0.000872
INTBLK - 0.01108 0.017 0.429        0.512 0.002000
CEOBLK - -1.41990 0.790 3.234        0.072* -0.002580
SIZE + 0.09102 0.155 0.346        0.557 0.000012
PUB + 0.00142 0.001 5.749        0.017** 0.066546
OPTEXP - -0.00148 0.011 0.019        0.891 -0.000268
RET12  0.00943 0.006 2.784        0.095* 0.001702
RET123 + 3.31918 5.379 0.381        0.537 0.226243
RISK  -0.01812 0.377 0.002        0.962 -0.000033
GROWTH + 1.11662 0.549 4.140        0.042** 0.002015
LEVERAGE + 0.00100 0.002 0.292        0.589 0.000002
Constant  -1.42704 1.540 0.859        0.354 
   
Pseudo R-square = 0.169 
Number of Observations = 178 
Chi-square = 24.141, Significance Level = 0.191. 
* Significant at the 10% level 
** Significant at the 5% level 
PUB = natural log of Article Count 
OPTEXP = Option Expense / Market Value of Equity 
SIZE = natural log of Market Value of Equity 
GROWTH = 1 / (Price to Book) 
RET123 = {[(High 6 + Low 6)/2]/ [(High 4 + Low 4)/2]}-1. (The following stock price data were 
collected from CRSP, and were used to compute the variable RET123: HIGH4 is highest stock 
price on January 20, 1992; HIGH5 is highest stock price on January 21, 1992; HIGH6 is highest 
stock price on January 22, 1992; LOW4 is lowest stock price on January 20, 1992; LOW5 is 
lowest stock price on January 21, 1992; and LOW6 is lowest stock price on January 22, 1992.) 
Please see Table 3-1 for descriptions of all other variables. 
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Table 4-6 
SUMMARY OF REGRESSION RESULTS EXCLUDING RET123 
 
Variable
Predicted 
Sign
Estimated 
Coefficient
Standard 
Error
Wald 
Statistic
 
Significance
Marginal 
Effect
INDPNT + -0.01566 0.010 2.571        0.109 -0.001901
CEOCHR - -0.12772 0.280 0.208        0.648 -0.000154
DIRTNR - -0.02903 0.037 0.610        0.435 -0.003540
DIRSHP + 0.12139 0.124 0.951        0.329 0.014018
FINEXP + 0.02114 0.009 5.723        0.017** 0.002532
MEETING + 0.05500 0.033 2.735        0.098* 0.006506
STOCK  0.09749 0.112 0.756        0.384 0.011356
BRDSIZE - -0.03762 0.043 0.776        0.378 -0.004602
CEOTNR - -0.00115 0.017 0.005        0.946 -0.000139
INTBLK - 0.02226 0.011 3.877        0.049** 0.002664
CEOBLK - -1.53791 0.490 9.844        0.002** -0.001866
SIZE + 0.26749 0.111 5.820        0.016** 0.000024
PUB + -0.00010 0.000 0.062        0.803 -0.003562
OPTEXP - -0.00123 0.002 0.500        0.480 -0.000149
RET12  0.00545 0.004 1.776        0.183 0.000657
RISK  -0.45044 0.245 3.375        0.066* -0.000544
GROWTH + 0.64503 0.285 5.132        0.023** 0.000776
LEVERAGE + -0.00034 0.001 0.055        0.814 -4.10E-07
Constant  -1.93491 0.971 3.973        0.046** 
   
Pseudo R-square = 0.164 
Number of Observations = 326 
Chi-square = 42.722, Significance Level = 0.001. 
* Significant at the 10% level 
** Significant at the 5% level 
PUB = natural log of Article Count 
OPTEXP = Option Expense / Market Value of Equity 
SIZE = natural log of Market Value of Equity 
GROWTH = 1 / (Price to Book) 
Please see Table 3-1 for descriptions of all other variables. 
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Analysis of Results 
Table 4-7 summarizes whether each of the hypotheses are supported or not 
supported by the regression results. 
 
Table 4-7 
CONCLUSIONS OF HYPOTHESIS TESTS 
                                                      
Hypothesis 
Independent 
Variable 
              
Conclusion 
Percentage 
of 
independent 
directors on 
the board 
H1: A company with a board 
that has a greater percentage 
of independent members will 
be more likely to expense 
employee stock options. 
 
INDPNT Not 
Supported 
CEO/board 
chairman 
split 
H2: A company whose CEO 
is also chairman of the board 
will be less likely to expense 
employee stock options. 
 
CEOCHR Not 
Supported 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Board 
Independence 
Tenure of 
independent 
directors 
H3: A company whose 
independent directors have 
fewer years of tenure will be 
more likely to expense 
employee stock options. 
 
DIRTNR Not 
Supported 
H4: A company whose 
independent directors have 
more outside directorships 
will be more likely to 
expense employee stock 
options. 
 
DIRSHP Not 
Supported 
 
 
 
 
 
Board Expertise 
 
H5: A company whose board 
has a greater percentage of 
independent directors with 
financial expertise will be 
more likely to expense 
employee stock options. 
 
FINEXP Supported 
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Table 4-7 (Continued) 
CONCLUSIONS OF HYPOTHESIS TESTS 
                                                      
Hypothesis 
Independent 
Variable 
            
Conclusion 
 
Board Diligence 
 
H6: A company that has 
more board meetings per 
year will be more likely to 
expense employee stock 
options. 
MEETING Supported 
 
 
 
Board Ownership 
 
H7: There is no impact of 
independent directors’ 
average stock (including 
stock options) ownership in 
the company on the 
likelihood of a company’s 
expensing of employee stock 
options. 
 
STOCK Not 
Supported 
 
Board Size 
 
H8: A company with a 
smaller board will be more 
likely to expense employee 
stock options. 
 
BRDSIZE Not 
Supported 
 
CEO Tenure 
 
H9: A company where the 
CEO has more years of 
tenure will be less likely to 
expense employee stock 
options. 
 
CEOTNR Not 
Supported 
H10: A company with 
greater percentage of 
cumulative internal 
blockholder (>5%) 
ownership will be less likely 
to expense employee stock 
options. 
 
INTBLK Not 
Supported 
 
 
Internal Blockholders 
H11: A company where the 
largest blockholder is the 
CEO will be less likely to 
expense employee stock 
options. 
 
CEOBLK Supported 
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Hypothesis 1, 2, and 3 are related to board independence, and are concerned with 
different measurement of board independence. Hypothesis 1 predicts that a company with 
a board that has a greater percentage of independent members will be more likely to 
expense employee stock options. However, contrary to the prediction, the estimated 
coefficient of the variable INDPNT has a negative sign, and is statistically insignificant. 
Hypothesis 1 was developed based on findings in the accounting literature of outside 
directors’ impact on earnings management. Previous studies (Xie et al. 2003; Klein 2002; 
Beekes et al. 2004; Peasnell et al. 2000) found that companies with greater percentage of 
independent directors are less likely to manage earnings upward. Similar impact of the 
percentage of independent directors on option expensing decisions was hypothesized based 
on the assumption that the option expensing decision has the same nature as any other 
earnings management issue. The regression results in the current study are, however, 
consistent with accounting researchers’ findings about independent directors’ impact on 
option reporting decisions. Seethamraju and Zach (2003) did not find an association 
between the percentage of outsiders serving on the board of directors and the likelihood of 
expensing options. Baker (1999) found an insignificant and negative impact of the 
proportion of inside directors on the board on the degree of discount (underreporting) in 
companies’ estimated executive stock option values in proxy statements, which, according 
to Baker (1999), is contrary to general conclusions on the impact of inside directors. 
Together with these studies (Seethamraju and Zach 2003; Baker 1999), the current study 
suggests that reporting of employee stock options, including the option expensing decision, 
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may not be a pure earnings management issue, and that such decisions may be complicated 
by additional factors. 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that a company whose CEO is also chairman of the board 
will be less likely to expense employee stock options. The estimated coefficient of the 
variable CEOCHR has a negative sign, as predicted, but is statistically insignificant. 
Aboody et al. (2003) did not find a significant influence of “whether the CEO is a board 
member” on option expensing decisions. Baker (1999) found that the degree of discount 
(underreporting) in executive stock option value estimates in proxy statements tended to be 
greater for a company whose CEO was also the chairman of the board, controlling for firm 
size. The finding of the current study is consistent with that of Aboody et al. (2003), which 
examined the impact of CEO board membership on option expensing specifically. 
Hypothesis 3 predicts that a company whose independent directors have fewer 
years of tenure will be more likely to expense employee stock options. The estimated 
coefficient of the variable DIRTNR has a negative sign, as predicted, but is statistically 
insignificant. 
Hypothesis 4 and 5 are related to board expertise. Hypothesis 4 tests governance 
expertise of the board, and hypothesis 5 tests the financial expertise of the board. 
Hypothesis 4 predicts that a company whose independent directors have more outside 
directorships will be more likely to expense employee stock options. The estimated 
coefficient of the variable DIRSHP has a positive sign, as predicted, but is statistically 
insignificant. Hypothesis 5 predicts that a company whose board has a greater percentage 
of independent directors with financial expertise will be more likely to expense employee 
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stock options. The estimated coefficient of the variable FINEXP has a positive sign, as 
predicted, and is statistically significant at p<0.05. Hypothesis 5 is supported. While 
previous research (Xie et al. 2003) has found board governance and financial expertise 
tend to constrain earnings management, no prior study has examined the impact of board 
expertise on option expensing decisions. The current study has found board financial 
expertise to be an important influence on option expensing decisions. 
Hypothesis 6 is related to board diligence. Hypothesis 6 predicts that a company 
that has more board meetings per year will be more likely to expense employee stock 
options. The estimated coefficient of the variable MEETING has a positive sign, as 
predicted, and is statistically significant at p<0.10. Hypothesis 6 is supported. While 
previous research (Xie et al. 2003) has found board diligence (in terms of number of board 
meetings) tends to constrain earnings management, no prior study has examined the impact 
of board diligence on option expensing decisions. The current study has found board 
diligence to be an influence on option expensing decisions. 
Hypothesis 7 is related to board ownership. Hypothesis 7 predicts that there is no 
impact of independent directors’ average stock (including stock options) ownership in the 
company on the likelihood of a company’s expensing of employee stock options. The 
estimated coefficient of the variable STOCK has a positive sign, which suggests that the 
greater independent directors’ stock ownership, the more likely that the company will 
expense employee stock options. However, the coefficient is statistically insignificant at 
conventional levels. In the accounting literature, results concerning the impact of directors’ 
ownership on monitoring effectiveness are inconclusive. Some studies (Kren and Kerr 
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1997; Farrell and Whidbee 2000) found directors’ ownership will increase their monitoring 
effectiveness, while the study by Carcello and Neal (2003) found an opposite effect. This 
may be explained by the contrary effects of interest alignment caused by long-term 
ownership and earnings management incentive caused by short-term ownership (John and 
Senbet 1998; Noe and Rebello 1996; Millstein 2002; Pitt 2002; Carcello and Neal 2003). 
Even in the specific situation of option reporting, the results concerning the impact of 
directors’ ownership on their monitoring effectiveness are inconclusive. Aboody et al. 
(2003) found that the greater the “the proportion of equity held by outside directors,” the 
more likely that the company would expense employee stock options. In their examination 
of votes on option expensing proposals, Ferri et al. (2003) found “that on average, insiders’ 
ownership is positively associated to votes against expensing, suggesting at least some 
insiders might fear that expensing will limit their ability to extract excessive (option) 
compensation rents” (1). Ferri et al. (2003) defined “insiders” as “executive officers and 
directors.” Seethamraju and Zach (2003) did not find any relation between inside/outside 
directors’ ownership and the likelihood of firms’ expensing of employee stock options. 
Baker (1999) did not find significant impact of stockholdings “by the non-CEO director 
with the largest block of ownership” on the degree of discount in option value estimates in 
proxy statements. The coefficient estimation in the current study, although statistically 
insignificant, suggests that for the sample firms, the interest alignment effect of long-term 
ownership overweights speculative incentives of short-term ownership. 
Hypothesis 8 is related to board size. Hypothesis 8 predicts that a company with a 
smaller board will be more likely to expense employee stock options. The estimated 
 77
coefficient of the variable BRDSIZE has a negative sign, as predicted, which suggests that 
a smaller board will be more likely to influence the company to expense options. However, 
the coefficient is statistically insignificant at conventional levels. There are contrary 
arguments (Xie et al. 2003; Bushman et al. 2004) in the accounting literature concerning 
the impact of board size on monitoring effectiveness, some research (Beasley 1996; Vafeas 
2000) lends support to the argument that smaller boards may be more effective in 
monitoring because of less bureaucracy, other research (Felo et al. 2003) lends support to 
the argument that larger boards may be more effective in monitoring because of more 
resources available to carry out the monitoring function. Concerning the relation of board 
size to option reporting specifically, Baker (1999) found that the degree of discount 
(underreporting) in executive stock option value estimates in proxy statements was greater 
for companies with larger boards, controlling for firm size. The result of the current study 
is consistent with the findings of Baker (1999), and supports the argument that smaller 
boards are better at monitoring because of less bureaucracy costs. 
Hypothesis 9 is related to CEO tenure. Hypothesis 9 predicts that a company where 
the CEO has more years of tenure will be less likely to expense employee stock options. 
The estimated coefficient of the variable CEOTNR has a negative sign, as predicted, but is 
statistically insignificant. Shen (2003) proposed that “the risk of managerial opportunism is 
low during the early years of CEO tenure; however, it increases significantly after the CEO 
has proven his or her leadership on the job,” that is, in the later years of CEO tenure. The 
result of the current study supports the argument of Shen (2003). 
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Hypothesis 10 and 11 are related to internal blockholders. Hypothesis 10 predicts 
that a company with greater percentage of cumulative internal blockholder (>5%) 
ownership will be less likely to expense employee stock options. The coefficient of the 
variable INTBLK is statistically significant at p<0.05, but has a positive sign, which is 
contrary to the prediction. Gordon and Pound (1993) stated that there are different effects 
of outside directors owning more than 5% stock of the firm. The significance of the 
ownership may motivate them to monitor the company more effectively. While on the 
other hand, since “most outside directors who are blockholders attain their ownership and 
board positions in friendly transactions with management,” such outside director-
blockholders are likely to “side with management” in their voting on shareholder proposals 
(Gordon and Pound 1993, 708). The findings of prior research (Denis et al. 1997; Gordon 
and Pound 1993) support the latter argument of Gordon and Pound (1993), that is, internal 
blockholders’ ownership impairs corporate governance. However, the findings from the 
current study suggests that, concerning the impact of corporate governance on option 
expensing specifically, strengthened monitoring incentives of internal (outside directors 
and executives) blockholders caused by ownership overweights the preference for 
management’s interests over shareholders’ interests. Hypothesis 11 predicts that a 
company where the largest blockholder is the CEO will be less likely to expense employee 
stock options. The estimated coefficient of the variable CEOBLK has a negative sign, as 
predicted, and is statistically significant at p<0.05. Hypothesis 11 is supported. This result 
indicates a negative impact of CEO blockholder on corporate governance. Since in the 
current study, internal blockholders include independent directors and executive officers, 
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the results of hypothesis testing related to Hypothesis 10 and 11 suggest that independent 
director blockholders and CEO blockholders may have different influence on corporate 
governance. The result of hypothesis testing related to Hypothesis 10 is consistent with 
that of Hypothesis 7 (board ownership). The estimated coefficient of the variable STOCK 
has a positive sign, which suggests that board ownership enhances corporate governance in 
the specific question of option expensing. 
 
Summary 
The current study examines the impact of corporate governance on corporate option 
expensing decisions. Each hypothesis tests a specific corporate governance factor. The 
empirical results related to Hypothesis 5, 6, and 11 support the argument that a company 
will be more likely to expense options if the board of directors has greater financial 
expertise, or is more diligent; the company will be less likely to expense options if the 
CEO is the largest blockholder. Contrary to predictions, the regression results related to 
hypothesis 10 indicate a significant and positive impact of internal blockholders’ 
cumulative ownership on the option expensing decision. Relating to the argument by 
Gordon and Pound (1993) about the uncertain impact of internal blockholders’ ownership, 
the findings of the current study suggests that, on the option expensing issue, strengthened 
monitoring incentives of internal (outside directors and executives) blockholders caused by 
ownership overweights their preference for management’s interests over shareholders’ 
interests. The negative estimated sign related to the variable INDPNT (percentage of 
independent directors on the board) is contrary to prediction. This result is consistent with 
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those of previous studies (Seethamraju and Zach 2003; Baker 1999) on the impact 
independent directors on option reporting choices specifically, but contrary to the results of 
studies (Xie et al. 2003; Klein 2002; Beekes et al. 2004; Peasnell et al. 2000) on the impact 
of independent directors on earnings management in general. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Five 
SUMMARY, LIMITATIONS, AND SUGGESTIONS FOR 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
 
 
Summary 
An increasing number of firms are issuing employees stock options as a 
compensation. An employee stock option is an option issued by a company to its 
employees. It’s a call option on the company’s own stock. It gives the employee-
optionholder the right to purchase the company’s stock at a strike price. The stock price 
can be below, at, or above the strike price at the time when the option is issued. If the stock 
price is below or at the strike price, the realizable profit to the option holder is zero. 
However, the profit will be greater than zero once the stock price exceeds the strike price, 
because the option holder can exercise the option, purchase the stock at the strike price and 
then sell it at the stock price, thus realize a profit. 
The accounting methods for employee stock options include the intrinsic value 
method and the fair value method. Both the intrinsic value method and the fair value 
method require the recognition of a compensation expense related to options. The 
distinction is on how to value the options. If the stock price is above the strike price, both 
the intrinsic value method and the fair value method acknowledge that the option has 
value, there is an option related compensation expense, and this expense should reduce net 
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income. The diversion of opinions rises in the situation when the stock price is below or at 
the strike price at the time of issuance, that is, the situation where there is no immediate 
realizable profit. Under this situation, according to the intrinsic value method, the option 
has no value, but according to the fair value method, the option has value. The value 
should be determined by an option pricing model. 
APB 25 Accounting for Stock Issued to Employees, which was issued in 1972, 
prescribes the intrinsic value method. The new standard SFAS 123 Accounting for Stock-
Based Compensation, which was issued in 1995, encourages the usage of the fair value 
method, but allows the intrinsic value method. If a company chooses to use the intrinsic 
value method, it has to disclose pro forma information in financial statement footnotes, as 
if the fair value method had been used. In the terminology of the popular press, a company 
is said to be expensing options if it uses the fair value method, and non-expensing if it uses 
the intrinsic value method. 
Most companies chose to issue employee stock options with a strike price which is 
at or above the stock price on the grant date, and use the intrinsic value method, in order to 
avoid expensing options. Thus, most companies have shown opposition to option 
expensing. However, in response to the recent accounting scandals, some companies have 
elected to expense options in order to signal higher quality earnings. Opponents of option 
expensing argue that: the option pricing models were developed for traded options and are 
not suitable for employee stock options; option expensing would put high-tech companies 
and other heavy users of options at a disadvantage because of the significant impact on 
earnings. Proponents of option expensing argue that: employee stock option is a 
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compensation expense, recognition of such expense improves earnings quality, reduces 
cost of capital, and facilitates better allocation of resources. 
Should employee stock options be expensed or not? The answer relates directly to 
the nature of employee stock options. Regarding the nature of options, there exist the asset 
view and the expense view. According to the asset view, the employee stock option is an 
asset. According to the expense view, it is an expense. Expense should reduce earnings, 
but asset should not. The expense view, which is used in several important previous 
studies, has received widespread support. The current study is based on the expense view 
assumption. 
Why did some companies choose to expense options while others chose not to do 
so? Several previous studies have examined a series of factors that affect this choice. These 
studies include: Aboody et al. (2003), Ferri et al. (2003), and Seethamraju and Zach 
(2003). Baker (1999) also studied some factors that affect other reporting choices related to 
employee stock options. Prior studies have limited their investigation of corporate 
governance to factors such as proportion of outside directors on the board, board 
ownership, etc. The results are inconclusive. The current study expands the variable set to 
include other corporate governance factors such as directors’ tenure, board expertise, board 
diligence, etc., and retests those factors with inconclusive results. The current study 
focuses only on those factors related to corporate governance, and seeks to answer this 
question: Do certain board characteristics and other corporate governance factors affect the 
expensing vs. non-expensing choice? 
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In order to answer this research question, previous studies related to corporate 
governance are reviewed, and hypotheses are developed accordingly. Corporate 
governance structures include internal and external structures. The board of directors is a 
kind of internal structure. The board assumes the monitoring and decision making roles. As 
the monitor, the board monitors management decisions, including accounting choices, to 
make sure that these decisions are consistent with shareholders’ interest. In assuming the 
decision making role, the board acts as a consultant only, and has no interest conflict with 
the management. The current study is concerned with the monitoring role of the board. 
Previous corporate governance studies have addressed such factors as board 
independence, expertise, diligence, ownership, size, CEO tenure, and internal 
blockholders. Researchers believe that board characteristics such as director independence, 
expertise, diligence, ownership, and size are essential to board effectiveness. They have 
found that board characteristics and other corporate governance factors have an impact on 
accounting choices. Based on the literature review, similar impact of these factors on the 
expensing vs. non-expensing choice is hypothesized in the current study. 
Board Independence. An independent board will influence management to act in 
shareholders’ interest, and consequently, to expense employee stock options. The first 
measurement of board independence is the percentage of independent directors on the 
board. It is hypothesized that a company with a greater percentage of independent directors 
will be more likely to expense options (H1). The next measurement of board independence 
is CEO/board chairman split. If the CEO is also the board chairman, board independence 
will be impaired. It is hypothesized that a company with a CEO as the board chairman will 
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be less likely to expense options (H2). The last measurement of board independence is the 
tenure of independent directors. With the increase in years of tenure, independent directors 
will become entrenched, and their independence will be impaired. It is hypothesized that a 
company where independent directors have fewer years of tenure will be more likely to 
expense options (H3). The hypotheses developed are only concerned with independent 
directors, because the current study is about how the board monitors management 
decisions, only independent, or non-management directors are relevant. 
Board Expertise. Board expertise enables directors to better monitor management 
decisions. Board expertise includes governance expertise and financial expertise. 
Governance expertise is measured by the average number of outside directorships held by 
independent directors. It is hypothesized that if the independent directors have more 
outside directorships, the company will be more likely to expense options (H4). Financial 
expertise is measured by the percentage of financially expertised independent directors on 
the board. It is hypothesized that, the greater this percentage, the more likely the company 
will expense options (H5). 
Board Diligence. Board diligence is measured by the number of board meetings per 
year. It is hypothesized that if the board hold more meetings per year, the company will be 
more likely to expense options (H6). 
Board Ownership. Board ownership is measured by independent directors’ average 
stock ownership in the company, including the ownership of stock options. Due to the 
inconclusive results in the literature regarding the impact of board ownership, it is 
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hypothesized that there is no impact of independent directors’ average ownership on the 
likelihood of a company’s expensing of options (H7). 
Board Size. Board size is measured by the number of directors on the board. A 
smaller board will be better at monitoring because of less bureaucracy. It is hypothesized 
that a company with a smaller board will be more likely to expense options (H8). 
CEO Tenure. CEO tenure is measured by the number of years. The CEO’s power 
increases with the increase in years of tenure, and this will impair corporate governance. It 
is hypothesized that a company where the CEO has more years of tenure will be less likely 
to expense options (H9). 
Internal Blockholders. Blockholders are those shareholders that hold 5% or more of 
the company’s stock. Internal blockholders are blockholders who are directors or executive 
officers. Internal blockholders’ ownership will impair corporate governance. It is 
hypothesized that a company with a greater percentage of cumulative internal blockholder 
ownership will be less likely to expense options (H10). Because of the significant 
influence of the CEO, when the CEO is the largest blockholder, it is very likely that 
corporate governance will be impaired. It is hypothesized that a company where the largest 
blockholder is the CEO will be less likely to expense options (H11). 
Using empirical data, a logistic regression is conducted to test the hypotheses. 
Logit regression is used because the dependent variable is a discrete choice variable with 
values of one or zero. The dependent variable is the choice of expensing vs. non-
expensing. The independent variables are the corporate governance related variables and 
control variables. The corporate governance related variables are: the percentage of 
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independent directors on the board, CEO/board chairman split, independent directors’ 
average years of tenure, average number of outside directorships held by independent 
directors, percentage of financially expertised independent directors on the board, number 
of board meetings, independent directors’ average stock ownership, number of directors on 
the board, CEO tenure, cumulative ownership of internal blockholders, and whether the 
CEO is the largest blockholder. The control variables are: firm size, publicity, option 
expense, Ret12, Ret123, risk, growth and leverage. 
An initial sample of 356 firms that had elected to expense employee stock options 
up to early September 2003 is identified from the report of Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc. (Bear, 
Stearns & Co., Inc. 2003), and a control sample of non-expensing firms is selected by 
matching industry membership and market capitalization. Empirical data are collected 
from Factiva, CRSP, Research Insight, companies’ proxy statements, 10-K and annual 
reports. The final sample consists of 235 expensing firms and 235 matched control firms, 
470 firms in total, due to availability of data and control firms. 
Table 4-7 in Chapter 4 summarizes the conclusions of hypothesis tests. The 
empirical results related to Hypothesis 5, 6, and 11 support the argument that a company 
will be more likely to expense options if the board of directors has greater financial 
expertise, or is more diligent; the company will be less likely to expense options if the 
CEO is the largest blockholder. Coefficient estimation related to these hypotheses (5, 6, 
and 11) are significant. Contrary to prediction, the regression results related to hypothesis 
10 indicate a significant and positive impact of internal blockholders’ cumulative 
ownership on the option expensing decision. Relating to the argument by Gordon and 
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Pound (1993) about the uncertain impact of internal blockholders’ ownership, the findings 
of the current study suggests that, on the option expensing issue, strengthened monitoring 
incentives of internal (outside directors and executives) blockholders caused by ownership 
overweights their preference for management’s interests over shareholders’ interests. 
Estimations related to all the other hypotheses are insignificant, but the signs of the 
coefficients were the same as predicted, except in the case of hypothesis 1. The negative 
estimated sign related to the variable INDPNT (percentage of independent directors on the 
board) is contrary to prediction. This result is consistent with those of previous studies 
(Seethamraju and Zach 2003; Baker 1999) on the impact independent directors on option 
reporting choices specifically, but contrary to the results of studies (Xie et al. 2003; Klein 
2002; Beekes et al. 2004; Peasnell et al. 2000) on the impact of independent directors on 
earnings management in general. The current study contributes to the accounting choice 
literature. 
 
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
In the current study, certain measurements are used for the corporate governance 
factors such as board independence, board expertise, board diligence, board ownership, etc. 
The validity of these measurements is limited, and future study could possibly search for 
better measurement for these corporate governance factors. Given a certain measurement 
for a variable, a significant question is what standards should be used to assign values to 
the variable, and selection of such standards will affect research findings. For example, the 
definition of financial expertise is borrowed from the Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) 
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report, as in Carcello and Neal (2003). Similarly, the standard selection question is also 
relevant to other variables, and there is always room for improvement. 
In the current study, certain matching principles have been used to identify the 
control sample, so that the control firm has similar industry classification and market 
capitalization as the expensing firm. This procedure has set limits on the sample size. 
However, it is suitable for the current study. Since most corporate governance data have to 
be hand-collected from companies’ proxy statements, it would be impossible to collect 
these data for a very large sample of firms. In future studies, when corporate governance 
data can be readily accessible from proxy statement analytical reports compiled by third 
parties instead of being collected manually by the researcher from proxy statements, it 
would become possible to use a larger sample as in Aboody et al. (2003) and Seethamraju 
and Zach (2003), instead of using the matching principle to identify the control sample. 
Due to the increased statistical power of hypotheses testing, such a study would probably 
find significant impact for those corporate governance factors where coefficient 
estimations are insignificant in the current study. In addition, using proxy statement 
analytical reports compiled by third parties instead of hand-collecting the corporate 
governance data from proxy statements can reduce variable measurement error and 
increase data quality. This effect will also contribute to the increased possibility of finding 
statistically significant coefficient estimations. 
Future studies may explore the unsolved questions suggested by the findings of the 
current study. The findings in the current study about the impact of the percentage of 
independent directors on option expensing decisions is contrary to findings in the 
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accounting literature about such impact on earnings management decisions (Xie et al. 
2003; Klein 2002; Beekes et al. 2004; Peasnell et al. 2000), but is consistent with the 
findings of such impact on option reporting decisions (Seethamraju and Zach 2003; Baker 
1999). This suggests that reporting of employee stock options, including the option 
expensing decision, is not a pure earnings management issue, and that such decisions may 
be complicated by additional factors. Future studies can clarify this tentative conclusion by 
re-examining the same question using different data, or by exploring theoretical 
explanations for the difference between the impact of independent directors on option 
reporting decisions and such impact on other earnings management issues. 
Probable endogeneity of corporate governance factors is another limitation of the 
current study, which is already discussed in chapter three of this dissertation. Future 
studies could possibly search for solution to this problem from theoretical and statistical 
perspectives. 
Future studies could possibly extend the current study from theoretical 
perspectives, and explore such questions as: what is the impact of audit committee 
characteristics on corporate option expensing decisions; what is the impact of other 
corporate governance factors (such as institutional investors, market for corporate control, 
etc.) on option expensing decisions; what is the impact of corporate governance on the 
timing of option expensing decisions; what is the impact of corporate governance on 
option reporting choices besides the choice of fair value method and intrinsic value 
method; and what is the impact of current corporate governance reform on option reporting 
choices. 
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APPENDIX 
 
THE ACE FRAMEWORK OF DEZOORT ET AL. (2002) 
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Source: DeZoort, F. T., D. R. Hermanson, D. S. Archambeault, and S. A. Reed. 2002 
Audit Committee Effectiveness: A Synthesis of the Empirical Audit Committee Literature. 
Journal of Accounting Literature 21: 38-75. Figure 1: Determinants of Audit Committee 
Effectiveness (ACE), p.43. 
 
